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INTRODUCTION 
Until very recently, commercial vessels travelling through waters that 
pose the greatest risk of pirate attacks typically relied on the world’s navies 
to protect them.  Indeed, the world community has spent more than one 
billion dollars in each of the last several years to support naval fleets that 
patrol pirate-infested waters, with the goal of repressing piracy.1  The 
vastness of the area in which pirates now operate, however, has meant that 
those navies simply cannot keep every ship safe.2  Despite the presence of 
the world’s navies, pirates staged 439 violent attacks and held 802 crew 
members hostage in 2011 alone.3  The rewards they reaped for doing so are 
great—the average ransom paid to pirates in 2011 was $4.97 million.4 
Calls to fill this apparent security gap left open by the limitations of 
the naval fleets has resulted in a relatively new phenomenon: since about 
mid-2011, flag states5 have increasingly authorized their ship owners to 
hire private armed guards to protect them against acts of maritime piracy. 
Estimates indicate that in 2011 the percentage of ships employing armed 
guards rose from approximately 10% to 50%.6  Ship owners hire guards 
from the 200 to 300 private maritime security companies (PMSCs)7 that 
 
 1.  Jon Bellish et al., The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 13–15 (Oceans Beyond Piracy, 
Working Paper, 2013), available at http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/ecop2012final_2 
.pdf; Anna Bowden & Shikha Basnet, The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2011, at 27 (One Earth 
Future Found., Working Paper, 2012), available at http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/ 
economic_cost_of_piracy_2011.pdf; David Gauvey Herbert, Piracy is Down, and Moving Farther Out, 
Burn After Reading, NAT’L J. (Apr. 21, 2010, 4:49 PM), https://web.archive.org/web/20101205065950/ 
http:/burnafterreading.nationaljournal.com/2010/04/piracy-is-down-and-why-thats-b.php. 
 2.  See David C. Ake, Defense Official: More Private Security Needed Aboard Ships to Combat 
Piracy, NAT’L DEF. (June 16, 2011, 4:10 PM), http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/ 
Posts/Post.aspx?ID=447 (stating that there are not enough navies in the world to provide protection to 
every ship travelling through the 2.9 million nautical miles of ocean in which pirates operate); see also 
Bowden & Basnet, supra note 1, at 8 (stating that in the past four years, pirates have expanded their 
operations from the Gulf of Aden well into the larger Indian Ocean). 
 3.  See INT’L MAR. BUREAU, INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY 
AGAINST SHIPS, REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 1 JANUARY–31 DECEMBER 2011, at 5-6, 11 (2011) 
[hereinafter ICC-IMB 2011 REPORT]. 
 4.  Bowden & Basnet, supra note 1, at 11. 
 5.  Ships fly the flag of a single state and are subject to the jurisdiction of that state on the high 
seas.  They must follow its licensing rules and regulations.  See generally United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea arts. 91–92, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
 6.  Nicolas Florquin, Graduate Inst. of Int’l & Dev. Studies, Escalation at Sea: Somali Privacy 
and Private Security Companies, in SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2012: MOVING TARGETS 191, 206 (2012) 
[hereinafter SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2012]; Bowden & Basnet, supra note 1, at 17. 
 7.  I use the label “private maritime security companies” to describe these firms because it is the 
label adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO).  E.g., Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], 
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have rushed in to capitalize on the apparent security gap.8  There is no 
official central registry identifying the security personnel employed on 
commercial ships.  In 2011, however, at least 2,700 private armed guards 
may have been operating in the Indian Ocean.9 
The obvious benefit of permitting private armed guards to aid the 
world’s navies in the fight against piracy is that they may save a ship and 
crew from attack.  An oft-cited anecdote suggests that no ship carrying 
armed guards has been successfully pirated.10  On the other hand, 
permitting private citizens to engage in activities that have thus far been 
reserved for state military personnel poses risks.  Military personnel—like 
those participating in the United Nations-sanctioned anti-piracy missions—
are trained to operate on the high seas and to follow a chain of command.  
They are also subject to military discipline or other state laws should they 
commit abuses.  By contrast, private armed guards may not be trained in 
maritime operations or may not understand or be prepared to abide by the 
various state laws that govern the use or transport of weapons as they travel 
from one location to the next.11  Further, no coordinated set of guidelines 
currently regulates the use of private armed guards on ships, and states, for 
the most part, are not interested in vetting potential guards or setting 
accreditation standards for guards that protect ships while travelling 
 
Interim Guidance to Private Maritime Security Companies Providing Privately Contracted Armed 
Security Personnel on board Ships in the High Risk Area, IMO Doc. MSC.1/Circ. 1443 (May 25, 2012) 
[hereinafter Circ. 1443].  The IMO is the United Nations’ specialized agency responsible for, among 
other things, improving maritime safety.  Many other, but synonymous, labels exist to describe the 
firms that provide armed guards to escort ships travelling through areas posing a high risk of pirate 
attacks.  For example, some commentators use the label “private armed security guards.” See, e.g., 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, H.C. 1318, PIRACY OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA, 2010–12, ¶ 26 (U.K.) 
[hereinafter FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 2012 REPORT].  Others use the label “private military 
security companies.” See, e.g., JAMES BROWN, PIRATES AND PRIVATEERS: MANAGING THE INDIAN 
OCEAN’S PRIVATE SECURITY BOOM (2012), available at http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/ 
pirates-and-privateers-managing-indian-oceans-private-security-boom. 
 8.  Sandra I. Erwin, Security Firms Divided Over How to Succeed in the Anti-Piracy Business, 
NAT’L DEF., Aug. 2012, at 20, available at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2012/ 
August/Pages/SecurityFirmsDividedOverHowtoSucceedintheAnti-PiracyBusiness.aspx. 
 9.  BROWN, supra note 7, at 6. 
 10.  SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2012, supra note 6, at 208 (noting that this claim may be accurate but 
cannot be verified). 
 11.  See, e.g., IMO, Interim Guidance to Shipowners, Ship Operators, and Shipmasters on the Use 
of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel on board Ships in the High Risk Area, Annex ¶ 1, 
IMO Doc. MSC.1/Circ. 1405 (May 23, 2011) [hereinafter Circ. 1405] (noting the issue of identifying 
reliable private armed security); id. Annex ¶ 3.3 (noting the issue of command authority); id. Annex ¶ 
3.4 (noting the issues concerning weapons carriage); id. Annex ¶ 3.5 (discussing the need for clear rules 
on the use of force between the ship owner, PMSC, and master); IMO, Interim Recommendations for 
Flag States Regarding the Use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel on board Ships in the 
High Risk Area, Annex ¶ 3, IMO Doc. MSC.1/Circ. 1406 (May 23, 2011) [hereinafter Circ. 1406] 
(noting concerns about the possible escalation of violence). 
DUTTON MACRO CLEAN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2014  1:16 PM 
110 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 24:107 
through pirate-infested waters.12  Although private guards may keep ships 
safe from attack, there are no assurances that they will do so in a way that 
does not escalate violence, involve unlawful use of force, endanger 
innocent seafarers, or cause international incidents. 
States should not be permitted to include private citizens in the fight 
against piracy without first ensuring that they will abide by governing laws. 
Additionally, if the private guards fail to abide by the governing laws, the 
states must hold them accountable.  Currently, only some states provide 
any guidance regarding the use of armed guards, and even that guidance 
could be more detailed.13  This Article argues that states need to do more.  
At the very least, it urges states to agree on vetting and monitoring 
procedures to make certain that any guards who are hired by ship owners 
are well trained and prepared to safely transport, store, and use weapons.  
States are responsible for the fight against piracy, and if they want to 
include private contractors in that fight, they should act responsibly by 
regulating and monitoring the guards’ conduct.  Otherwise, in a world in 
which each state is operating under a different set of rules, or no rules at all, 
the likely outcome is chaotic and violent seas—and perhaps the next 
“Blackwater moment.”14 
In fact, those “Blackwater moments” may already be occurring, as 
reports indicate that “some overzealous or untrained guards are shooting 
indiscriminately, killing pirates and sometimes innocent fishermen before 
verifying the threat.”15  A March 2011 encounter between private armed 
guards aboard the bulk cargo vessel Avocet and alleged pirates in the Gulf 
of Aden illustrates this point.  Footage apparently leaked without 
authorization shows PMSC personnel firing more than one hundred shots at 
an approaching skiff after their team leader ordered them to fire “warning 
shots.”16  The firing continues even after the skiff, whose driver had been 
 
 12.  See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 13.  See discussion infra Part III (discussing the increase in the number of states authorizing the 
use of armed security personnel and providing details about some state laws and guidance in that 
regard). 
 14.  See Michelle Wiese Bockmann & Alan Katz, Shooting to Kill Pirates Risks Blackwater 
Moment, BLOOMBERG (May 8, 2012, 7:31 PM ET), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-
08/shooting-to-kill-pirates-risks-blackwater-moment.html (referencing the 2007 incident during which 
security guards employed by Blackwater Worldwide allegedly shot and killed civilians in Baghdad); see 
also Katharine Houreld, Private Guards Kill Somali Pirate for First Time, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. 
(Mar. 24, 2010, 1:57 AM), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2010/Mar/24/private-guards-kill-somali-
pirate-for-first-time/?#article-copy (referencing concerns that jittery private guards could accidentally 
open fire on ordinary Somali fishermen). 
 15.  Bockmann & Katz, supra note 14. 
 16.  See id. (quoting a representative of Eagle Bulk Shipping, which owns the Avocet, asserting 
that the footage should never have become public). 
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either injured or killed in the exchange, crashes into the Avocet.17  The 
PMSC has defended the actions of its personnel as justified, stating that the 
guards feared for their lives and were acting in self-defense.18  A maritime 
industry expert concluded, however, that the video demonstrates that the 
guards used excessive force to respond to the alleged attack.19  He suggests 
that the guards never fired actual warning shots and that the rapid and 
sustained rate of gunfire was not an acceptable response to the threat.20  
The maritime security industry is concerned that similar incidents are 
occurring but are not being reported or investigated for fear of liability or 
other consequences.21 
One can argue that only states and their navies should be responsible 
for protecting the world’s ships and crews against pirate attacks.  Yet 
circumstances dictate that not all roles in the fight against piracy will be 
played only by state navies and United Nations-sanctioned military 
operations: the responsibilities of private armed guards will be ever more 
accepted.  This Article recognizes the need to adapt to this new reality of 
increasing privatization of tasks that were once assigned to states and their 
militaries.22  At the same time, it urges states as a whole to accept 
responsibility for ensuring that the private guards who are authorized to use 
weapons to fight pirates in international waters only operate under a clear 
and coordinated set of laws and guidelines. 
This Article continues in Part I with a brief discussion of modern 
maritime piracy and the international community’s efforts to combat it 
using naval patrols.  Part II provides background on private armed guards, 
the services they provide, the risks associated with permitting ship owners 
 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. (citing Daren Knight, a maritime security consultant, who argues that the guards used 
excessive force, which violates international law on the use of force). 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  See, e.g., id.; Michelle Wiese Bockmann, Ships with Armed Guards Seen Not Reporting 
Somali Pirate Strikes, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 23, 2012, 6:37 AM ET), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
2012-10-23/ships-with-armed-guards-seen-not-reporting-somali-pirate-strikes.html. 
 22.  Although employing private armed guards in the fight against piracy is a new phenomenon, 
states have been using private individuals and firms to supply a wide range of military and security 
services since the 1950s, a trend that increased dramatically in the early 1990s.  Jackson Nyamuya 
Maogoto & Benedict Sheehy, Private Military Companies & International Law: Building New Ladders 
of Legal Accountability & Responsibility, 11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 99, 105 (2009).  Probably 
most familiar to readers is the role private military employees played in the recent wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq.  Indeed, records indicate that as of March 2010, at least 60 different privatized military firms 
were providing personnel from at least 30 different countries to support operations in Iraq.  Huma T. 
Yasin, Playing Catch-Up: Proposing The Creation Of Status-Based Regulations To Bring Private 
Military Contractor Firms Within The Purview Of International And Domestic Law, 25 EMORY INT’L 
L. REV. 411, 415 (2011). 
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to hire armed security personnel to provide individualized protection 
against pirate attacks, and the maritime industry’s evolving stance on the 
issue.  Part III explores and compares some of the different approaches 
states have used to address and regulate the use of armed guards in the fight 
against piracy.  Part IV addresses deficiencies in the current approaches 
and suggests standards or practices to mitigate the risks associated with 
private guards wielding weapons on the world’s oceans, on which all states 
should agree. 
I. THE PROBLEM OF MODERN MARITIME PIRACY 
A. The Nature of Modern Maritime Piracy 
Presently, maritime piracy plays a prominent role on the global stage.  
For the past several years, reports of violent attacks on ships and hefty 
ransom payments to secure the safe release of captains and crews have 
become a regular feature of the world’s daily news.23  Although not all of 
those attacks are linked to Somalia, the emergence of Somali piracy on a 
grand scale beginning in the mid-2000’s helps to illustrate the increased 
global threat posed by maritime piracy.24  The International Maritime 
Bureau (IMB) Piracy Reporting Centre reported 1,850 worldwide pirate 
attacks between January 2007 and December 2011.25  Attacks during 2009, 
 
 23.  See, e.g., Hijacked Vietnamese Cargo Ship Expected to Be Ransomed for $5 Mln, TALK 
VIETNAM (Oct. 25, 2012), http://talkvietnam.com/2012/10/hijacked-vietnamese-cargo-ship-expected-to-
be-ransomed-for-5-mln/ (reporting on the January 2012 capture of a Vietnamese cargo ship 520 miles 
off the coast of Oman); Somali Pirates Capture Supertanker, $150M of Oil, USA TODAY (Feb. 10, 
2011, 1:41 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2011-02-09-pirates-hijack-supertanker_ 
N.htm (reporting that in February 2011 Somali pirates captured the Greek supertanker MV Irene SL and 
its two million barrels of crude oil while the tanker was travelling 200 miles off the coast of Oman); 
Somali Pirates Release Greek-Owned VLCC, Hijack German Cargo Ship the Next Day, MAR. 
EXECUTIVE (Apr. 11, 2011), http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/somali-pirates-release-greek-
owned-vlcc-mv-irene-sl (reporting that in April 2011 Somali pirates attacked the MV Susan K, a 
German cargo ship, while it was travelling 35 miles off the coast of Oman); Somali Pirates Hijack 
Russian China-bound Oil Tanker, BBC News, BBC.COM (May 5, 2010, 16:24 GMT),  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8661816.stm (reporting that in May 2010 pirates attacked a 96,000 ton oil 
tanker 560 miles off the Somali coast); Xan Rice & Lee Glendinning,  Pirates Anchor Hijacked 
Supertanker off Somali Coast, GUARDIAN (Nov. 18, 2008, 13:15 EST), http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
world/2008/nov/18/somalia-oil (reporting on the 2008 capture of a Saudi supertanker 450 miles off the 
coast of Kenya). 
 24.  See, e.g., Special Advisor on Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, Report 
of the Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast of 
Somalia, transmitted by letter dated 24 January 2011 from the Secretary-General to the President of 
the Security Council, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. S/2011/30 (Jan. 24, 2011) (by Jack Lang) [hereinafter Lang 
Report] (referencing the increase in Somali piracy in 2005 after a tsunami led to further instability in the 
country). 
 25.  ICC-IMB 2011 REPORT, supra note 3, at 5–6 (providing graphical break-downs of piracy 
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2010, and 2011 numbered more than 400 each year—an amount that 
exceeds the total reported attacks in 2007 by more than 50 percent.26  The 
IMB reports fewer successful attacks in 2012 than in the several prior 
years,27 but it is not yet time for celebration.  Between January and 
September 2012, 585 seafarers were taken hostage—as compared to 172 
during the same time period in 2007.28  Six seafarers were killed by pirates 
during 2012.29  These numbers are startling, even if they are lower than in 
some prior years.  As a recent United Nations Secretary-General Report 
warns: “Although there are signs of progress, they can easily be 
reversed.”30 
Although the number of attacks is down, piracy still poses a 
significant threat to the safe passage of vessels travelling through shared 
sea-lanes.  Pirates are sophisticated criminals who use violence to mount 
their attacks.31  The IMB reports that guns were used in 113 of the attacks 
that occurred during 201232 and that most attacks by Somali pirates now 
involve the use of weapons.33  Somali pirates are able to operate hundreds 
of nautical miles out to sea where they use larger fishing vessels—known 
 
attacks between January 2007 and December 2011).  In its annual report, the IMB includes acts of 
piracy and acts of armed robbery against ships, as well as attempts of the same.  The IMB’s definition 
of piracy includes illegal acts of violence against a ship travelling on the high seas or any act of inciting 
the same.  Id. at 3.  Its definition of armed robbery against ships includes acts of violence—or any act 
inciting an act of violence—against a ship located “within a State’s internal waters, archipelagic waters 
and territorial sea.”  Id. 
 26.  Id. at 5–6 (showing 263 actual and attempted attacks in 2007 as compared to 439 in 2011). 
 27.  See INT’L MAR. BUREAU, INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY 
AGAINST SHIPS, REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 1 JANUARY–31 DECEMBER 2012, at 5–6 (2012) [hereinafter 
ICC-IMB 2012 REPORT] (showing a total of 297 actual and attempted attacks for the year 2012).  As is 
the case with prior years, the actual number of attacks may be greater than the number reported since 
the general belief is that shipping companies may underreport to avoid insurance premium increases.  
Eugene Kontorovich & Steven Art, An Empirical Examination of Universal Jurisdiction for Piracy, 104 
AM. J. INT’L L. 436, 440–41 (2010).  In fact, the results of a study by the British House of Commons 
Transport Committee indicated that potentially 25–50% of maritime piracy crimes are unreported.  
James Kraska & Brian Wilson, The Pirates of the Gulf of Aden: The Coalition Is the Strategy, 45 STAN. 
J. INT’L L. 243, 257 (2009). 
 28.  ICC-IMB 2012 REPORT, supra note 27, at 11. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 2020 (2011), ¶ 74, U.N. Doc. S/2012/783 (Oct. 22, 2012) [hereinafter S/2012/783 Report]. 
 31.  See, e.g., Lang Report, supra note 24, ¶ 13 (stating that piracy has “become an organized, 
lucrative and attractive criminal activity undertaken for heinous ends”); LAUREN PLOCH ET. AL, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R40528, PIRACY OFF THE HORN OF AFRICA 9 (Apr. 27, 2011) [hereinafter PLOCH 
2011] (noting that “some Somali pirate groups have developed sophisticated operational capabilities 
and have acquired weaponry, equipment, and funds that make them on par with or more effective than 
the local forces arrayed against them”). 
 32.  ICC-IMB 2012 REPORT, supra note 27, at 10. 
 33.  Id. at 20. 
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as “mother ships” (often acquired by acts of piracy)—from which they 
mount their attacks.34  From these mother ships, the pirates use small 
maneuverable skiffs powered with large outboard motors.35  With the help 
of AK-47 rifles and rocket propelled grenade launchers, today’s pirates 
have successfully attacked some of the world’s largest supertankers.36 
Pirate attacks do not just harm individuals travelling on the ships that 
are captured.  Piracy threatens the world economy and global trade, since 
90% of the world’s traded goods move by sea.37  Somali piracy is a 
particular danger to the 40% of world sea trade that passes through the 
Indian Ocean, the Gulf of Aden, and the Arabian Sea.38  While Somali 
pirates at one time operated within a concentrated geographical area in the 
waters off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden, they have more 
recently expanded their reach farther into the Indian Ocean.39  Additionally, 
pirate attacks on ships carrying oil threaten world energy supplies.40  Piracy 
also jeopardizes the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the Horn of 
Africa.41 
Moreover, the increasingly hefty ransoms paid to guarantee the release 
of innocent seafarers provide an incentive for pirates to continue their 
illegal and violent activities.  In 2011, pirates received an estimated $170 
million in ransom payments, a huge increase from the total of $110 million 
they received in 2010.42  In fact, the ransoms paid to pirates “have 
increased sevenfold over the last five years,” with average ransoms 
increasing from about $600,000 in 2007 to about $5 million in 2011.43 
 
 34.  LAUREN PLOCH ET. AL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40528, PIRACY OFF THE HORN OF AFRICA 
11 (Apr. 19, 2010) [hereinafter PLOCH 2010]. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  See, e.g., Somali Pirates Capture Supertanker, $150M of Oil, supra note 23 (reporting the 
capture of the Greek supertanker MV Irene SL); Somali Pirates Release Greek-Owned VLCC, Hijack 
German Cargo Ship the Next Day, supra note 23 (reporting the capture of the MV Susan K, a German 
cargo ship). 
 37.  FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 2012 REPORT, supra note 7, ¶14. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Bowden & Basnet, supra note 1, at 8. 
 40.  See, e.g., John Stewart, Somali Pirates: Steep Rise in Attacks, NEWS-INSURANCES (Mar. 28, 
2011), http://www.newsinsurances.co.uk/somali-pirates-steep-rise-in-attacks/0169475872 (reporting 
pirates’ seizure of the Irene SL, a tanker carrying two million barrels of Kuwaiti oil to the United 
States). 
 41.  For example, the World Food Program transports about ninety-five percent of its supplies by 
sea.  U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 
1846 (2008), ¶ 35, U.N. Doc. S/2009/146 (Mar. 16, 2009). 
 42.  S/2012/783 Report, supra note 30, ¶ 6. 
 43.  FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 2012 REPORT, supra note 7, ¶ 111.  Some ransoms recently 
paid to Somali pirates have been significantly higher.  In fact, in February 2011, pirates received a 
$13.5 million ransom payment to release the MV Irene, a supertanker carrying 2 million barrels of 
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B. The International Community’s Coordinated Naval Efforts to Combat 
the Threat of Modern Maritime Piracy 
Although maritime piracy remains a significant threat, the 
international community has engaged in some coordinated efforts to 
combat it.  In 2007, some countries began providing naval escorts to World 
Food Program ships delivering humanitarian aid.44  Since then, those naval 
escorts have accompanied about 150 vessels carrying essential 
humanitarian assistance.45  Beginning in late 2008, countries also began 
contributing naval resources to conduct counter-piracy operations.  Multi-
national naval forces (Combined Task Forces 150, 151, and 152), involving 
twenty-seven different states, operate around the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian 
Sea, and the Indian Ocean with the stated aim of deterring, disrupting, and 
suppressing acts of piracy.46  These forces have been joined by others, such 
as the European Union’s combined naval force (Operation Atalanta).47  The 
Council of the European Union has authorized Atalanta to operate until 
December 2014 and has allowed it to expand the reach of its activities to 
the coast and internal waters of Somalia.48  NATO has also sent ships on 
anti-piracy missions to the Horn of Africa.49  Other states, including Russia, 
China, India, South Korea, Japan, Malaysia, and Singapore, have 
complemented these multi-national operations by sending their own ships 
to patrol in the waters off the Somali coast.50  In total, between ten and 
sixteen naval ships conduct anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden and 
Indian Ocean on any given day.51 
Since 2008, the United Nations Security Council has backed these 
 
Kuwaiti oil destined for the United States and estimated to be worth $200 million.  Bowden & Basnet, 
supra note 1, at 11. 
 44.  Defence Committee, European Security and Defence Assembly/Assembly of Western 
European Union [ESDA], Report: The Role of the European Union in Combating Piracy, ¶ 46, ESDA 
Doc. No. A/2037 (June 4, 2009) (Kurt Bodewig, Aristotelis Pavlidis & Tarmo Kõuts) [hereinafter 
Report: The Role of the European Union in Combating Piracy]; ROGER MIDDLETON, PIRACY IN 
SOMALIA: THREATENING GLOBAL TRADE, FEEDING LOCAL WARS 7 (2008), available at 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/files/12203_1008piracysomalia.pdf.  In March 2010, China offered to 
deploy naval forces to assist European Union forces that were escorting World Food Program ships.  
PLOCH 2010, supra note 34, at 16. 
 45.  S/2012/783 Report, supra note 30, ¶ 34. 
 46.  FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 2012 REPORT, supra note 7, ¶ 44. 
 47.  Id.; see also Peter Chalk, Piracy Off the Horn of Africa: Scope, Dimensions, Causes and 
Responses, 16 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 89, 98 (2010) (describing NATO’s cooperation with Operation 
Atalanta). 
 48.  S/2012/783 Report, supra note 30, ¶ 34. 
 49.  Id. ¶ 35; Chalk, supra note 47, at 98; PLOCH 2010, supra note 34, at 24. 
 50.  FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 2012 REPORT, supra note 7, ¶ 44. 
 51.  Bowden & Basnet, supra note 1, at 25. 
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coordinated naval efforts to counter piracy with a number of resolutions 
authorizing military action against Somali pirates at sea and on Somali 
territory.  Under Resolution 1816, the Security Council authorized coalition 
navies cooperating with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of 
Somalia to enter Somalia’s territorial waters and use “all necessary means 
to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery” for an initial period of six 
months.52  That authorization was extended for one year under Resolution 
1846.53  The Security Council authorized even broader military action to 
combat piracy under Resolution 1851, allowing states to use land-based 
operations in Somalia to fight piracy.54  Under Resolution 1897, it extended 
the scope of allowable anti-piracy operations in Somalia’s territorial waters 
for another twelve months.55  Recent Security Council resolutions urge 
states to continue contributing to the naval forces that patrol the pirate-
infested waters off the coast of Somalia.56 
All of these coordinated naval efforts have likely contributed to the 
present reduction in the total number of reported and attempted attacks.57  
In fact, naval forces apparently “thwarted 126 attacks in 2008, 176 in 2009 
and 127 in 2010.”58  Furthermore, no World Food Program ship has been 
hijacked since the ships began receiving escorts from the world’s navies.59  
Similarly, ships travelling through the Gulf of Aden corridor have not been 
successfully attacked since naval forces began organizing commercial 
shipping vessels into transit groups.60  This process allows the navies to 
closely watch a designated number of ships to which they can promptly 
respond should they receive distress calls.61  The naval forces have also 
successfully captured pirates who have attacked or attempted to attack 
ships at sea.  Reports indicate that between January and August 2009 alone, 
the world’s naval forces “encountered” more than 500 pirates, 10 of whom 
were killed, 282 of whom were disarmed and released, and 235 of whom 
were transferred for prosecution.62 
 
 52.  S.C. Res. 1816, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008). 
 53.  S.C. Res. 1846, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008). 
 54.  S.C. Res. 1851, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008). 
 55.  S.C. Res. 1897, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1897 (Nov. 30, 2009). 
 56.  E.g., S.C. Res. 1950, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1950 (Nov. 23, 2010); S.C. Res. 2020, ¶ 7, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/2020 (Nov. 22, 2011). 
 57.  See S/2012/783 Report, supra note 30, ¶ 4 (noting that the actions by the naval forces have 
aided in reducing the number of successful pirate attacks). 
 58.  Lang Report, supra note 24, ¶ 39. 
 59.  FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 2012 REPORT, supra note 7, ¶ 49. 
 60.  Id. ¶ 49. 
 61.  Id. ¶ 50. 
 62.  PLOCH 2010, supra note 34, at 22. 
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C. The Continuing Threat of Maritime Pirate Attacks despite Coordinated 
Naval Patrols 
Despite the fact that the international community is spending more 
than $1 billion annually to support the various naval patrols,63 the threat of 
maritime piracy persists. The world’s navies have thwarted attacks, and the 
number of successful attacks is down in 2012.  The threat posed by piracy, 
however, remains real to individual seafarers and the international 
community.  Further, before 2012, the number of pirate attacks was 
growing in absolute terms, even as navies patrolled in an effort to help 
secure the safe passage of ships.64 
Some partially attribute the continued prevalence of piracy on the 
navies’ general “catch and release” policies.65  According to some reports, 
about 90% of pirates are released after capture, rather than being 
transferred to stand trial for their actions.66  Recent figures indicate that 
between 2006 and September 2012, about 1,186 suspected pirates have 
been prosecuted or await prosecution in twenty-one states.67  Yet this is 
only a small fraction of the number of pirates who have been captured 
attacking or attempting to attack ships.68 
Unless states are prepared to prosecute a sufficient number of pirates 
to send a signal that their criminal acts will not be tolerated, they must stop 
 
 63.  See Bowden & Basnet, supra note 1, at 24 (estimating that in 2011, nations spent about $1 
billion deploying the various naval patrols conducting anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden and 
Indian Ocean). 
 64.  See Lang Report, supra note 24, ¶ 39 (stating that the number of pirate attacks was increasing 
year over year notwithstanding the significant anti-piracy naval missions); FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
COMMITTEE  2012 REPORT, supra note 7, at 3 (stating that naval operations, among other things, had 
failed to “contain the growth in the overall number of attacks and the areas in which pirates can 
operate”). 
 65.  U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Possible Options To Further the 
Aim of Prosecuting and Imprisoning Persons Responsible for Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea 
off the Coast of Somalia, Including, in Particular, Options for Creating Special Domestic Chambers 
Possibly with International Components, a Regional Tribunal or an International Tribunal and 
Corresponding Imprisonment Arrangements, Taking into Account the Work of the Contact Group on 
Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, the Existing Practice in Establishing International and Mixed 
Tribunals, and the Time and Resources Necessary to Achieve and Sustain Substantive Results, ¶ 9, U.N. 
Doc. S/2010/394 (July 6, 2010) (“In order to be effective, naval operations apprehending suspects 
should result in prosecutions.  The risk otherwise is that suspects are released at sea, or repatriated, and 
return to commit further acts of piracy or armed robbery at sea.”). 
 66.  Lang Report, supra note 24, ¶¶ 42–43. 
 67.  S/2012/783 Report, supra note 30, ¶ 44. 
 68.  Lang Report, supra note 24, ¶¶ 42–43 (noting that states prosecuted about 1/3 of the pirates 
captured between 2008 and 2010 but that, by 2011, states were releasing more than 90% of captured 
pirates). 
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pirates before they are able to mount their attacks.69  The anti-piracy naval 
patrols, however, simply do not have the capacity to secure the safe 
passage of every transiting ship.70  In many cases, pirates are able to board 
and take hostages within fifteen to thirty minutes of being sighted.71  This 
amount of time is too short for a naval ship to respond unless it is only a 
few miles away.72  Indeed, the world’s “[n]aval forces have found it 
difficult to monitor pirates and to respond swiftly to attacks . . . .”73  
According to the United Kingdom’s Major General Howes (Operation 
Commander of Atalanta), about “83 [ships] would be needed in order to 
provide response conditions of half an hour.”74  William Wechsler, the 
United States Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics 
and Global Threats, offers a more pessimistic view, suggesting that pirates 
now operate within an area of approximately 2.9 million nautical miles and 
that all the navies in the world could not possibly protect such a space.75 
Thus, while naval ships have been successful in thwarting some pirate 
attacks, at present they do not have the capacity to protect every ship 
travelling through the Indian Ocean.  Moreover, there is reason to believe 
that states will provide fewer naval resources for counter-piracy efforts in 
the upcoming years because of budgetary pressures.  This state of affairs 
has caused some stakeholders in the fight against piracy to focus on the role 
private armed guards might play in protecting ships, cargo, and crews 
against attacks.76  The recent increased reliance on armed guards to assist in 
the fight against maritime piracy and the risks associated with relying on 
them is discussed in Part II below. 
 
 69.  See FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 2012 REPORT, supra note 7, at 40 (noting that simply 
returning pirates to sea or land may disrupt their activities but will likely have no long-term deterrent 
effect). 
 70.  See Bowden and Basnet, supra note 1, at 25 (predicting a decrease in EUNAVFOR, NATO, 
and national contributions to the fight against piracy due to decreased defense expenditures); FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 2012 REPORT, supra note 7, ¶ 51 (noting that as naval operations have become 
more successful at ensuring ships safe passage through the Gulf of Aden corridor, pirates have 
expanded their activities into the larger Indian Ocean, increasing exponentially the difficulty of securing 
the high seas). 
 71.  PLOCH 2011, supra note 31, at 10. 
 72.  Id. at 10–11. 
 73.  FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 2012 REPORT, supra note 7, ¶ 51. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Ake, supra note 2. 
 76.  See FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 2012 REPORT, supra note 7, ¶ 25 (noting that some in the 
shipping industry have called on states to allow them to pay to have armed military personnel on board 
their ships when transiting through pirate-infested waters); PLOCH 2011, supra note 31, at 36 (noting 
that some industry representatives have argued for the ability to hire armed security teams to deter and 
respond to pirate attacks). 
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II. USING PRIVATE ARMED GUARDS IN COUNTER-PIRACY 
OPERATIONS 
A. Ship Owners Pay for Private Armed Guards to Fill the Security Gap in 
Naval Counter-Piracy Operations 
The apparent security gap left open by the limitations of the world’s 
navies caused ship owners to begin calling for more protection of their 
ships when travelling through pirate-infested waters.77  In response, some 
200 to 300 PMSCs emerged, the bulk of which were created in 2011.78  
These companies, which claim to offer some sort of maritime security, now 
provide armed escorts for 50% or more of the vessels transiting through 
areas carrying a high risk of pirate activity.79  Most companies providing 
these maritime security services are British or American and are often 
founded or staffed by retired military personnel.80  The cost of hiring 
private guards is not cheap: a PMSC’s services to secure a safe passage can 
range from $15,000 to $100,000, depending on the number and quality of 
the guards employed, the ship’s size and vulnerability, and the length of the 
trip.81  On the other hand, the expense may be warranted.  Notably, as of 
mid-2012, pirates had not successfully hijacked any commercial ship 
carrying armed guards.82  Moreover, some insurance companies offer 
significant discounts to vessels employing armed security when travelling 
through areas that pose a high risk of pirate attacks.83 
 
 77.  See infra Part II.C. 
 78.  BROWN, supra note 7, at 2, 4; Erwin, supra note 8. 
 79.  See Laws and Guns: Piracy and Private Security, ECONOMIST, Apr. 14, 2012, at 69, available 
at http://www.economist.com/node/21552553 (estimating that private armed guards patrol the decks of 
about 40% of the large vessels travelling in pirate-infested waters); Piracy: A Threat to Maritime 
Security and the Global Economy, DIIRAD (Nov. 14, 2012, 16:06), http://www.diirad.com/news-in-
english/4298-piracy-a-threat-to-maritime-security-and-the-global-economy-.html (estimating that about 
60% of commercial carriers now hire private guards for protection). 
 80.  See FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 2012 REPORT, supra note 7, ¶ 26 (estimating that 50% of 
PMSCs are British-owned or operated); Laws and Guns: Piracy and Private Security, supra note 79, at 
69 (stating that most companies are British and started by Special Forces retirees); BROWN, supra note 
7, at 5 (stating that most PMSCs are British or American). 
 81.  Christopher Spearin, Private Military and Security Companies v. International Naval 
Endeavours v. Somali Pirates: A Security Studies Perspective, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 823, 828 (2012). 
 82. Issues Arising from the Use of Armed Guards, INCE & CO INT’L LLP, http://incelaw.com/misc/ 
Piracy-issues-arising-from-the-use-of-armed-guards/Piracy-Issues-arising-from-the-use-of-armed-
guards (last visited September 26, 2013). 
 83.  See Ship Insurers Offers Discount for Armed Guards on Ship, SHIPPING HERALD: THE MAR. 
PORTAL (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.shippingherald.com/Admin/ArticleDetail/ArticleDetailsInsurance/ 
tabid/121/ArticleID/1366/Ship-Insurers-Offers-Discount-for-Armed-Guards-on-Ship.aspx (reporting 
that some insurance companies offer premium reductions of up to 35% for ships with armed guards, 
resulting in savings of thousands of dollars for some high-value ships). 
DUTTON MACRO CLEAN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2014  1:16 PM 
120 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 24:107 
PMSCs provide armed guards in one of two ways: using ship-borne 
armed protection teams or armed convoy escort vessels.84  Ship-borne 
armed protection teams typically consist of three to ten guards who have 
prior naval or military training.85  These guards will often “embark with 
body armour, medical kits, satellite communications, night-vision 
equipment and weapons.”86  There is no standard type of weapon employed 
by PMSCs, and a decision on which weapons to provide their personnel 
may vary from firm to firm and also depends on the nature of the voyage.87  
Thus, armed guards may be equipped with pistols, shotguns, or even 
machine guns and sniper rifles.88  Protection teams will usually embark 
from ports near the Gulf of Aden and disembark some days later in 
southern Sri Lanka so that they can provide security in the waters most 
prone to pirate attacks.89 
Ship owners and operators must address the difficulty of boarding 
weapons when seeking to place armed guards on their ships.  Ship owners 
carrying arms must comply with the flag state laws90 and the laws of the 
state where they are incorporated.91  They must also comply with the laws 
of coastal states through which they transit.92  Some coastal states permit 
PMSCs to store their weapons in the state’s ports and sign the weapons on 
and off the ships that they are assigned to protect, allowing for transparency 
in PMSC arms procurement and transport.93  Other states, however, have 
strict laws forbidding foreign weaponry in their territories,94 while some 
 
 84.  Spearin, supra note 81, at 827. 
 85.  Id. at 827–28; BROWN, supra note 7, at 6. 
 86.  BROWN, supra note 7, at 7. 
 87.  SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2012, supra note 6, at 207–08. 
 88.  Id. at 208. 
 89.  BROWN, supra note 7, at 7. 
 90.  As noted above, ships fly the flag of a single state, which is ordinarily the state of the ship’s 
owners.  In some cases, however, ships fly “flags of convenience,” registering in a sovereign state 
different from the ship’s owners.  Flags of convenience jurisdictions are “open registry” states and 
typically allow ship owners to enjoy lower taxes and less stringent regulations than might the ship’s 
home state.  What are Flags of Convenience?, INT’L TRANSP. WORKERS’ FED’N, 
http://www.itfglobal.org/flags-convenience/sub-page.cfm (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).  “Closed registry 
states,” like the United States, by contrast, impose relatively strict registry and licensing criteria.  
Michael A. Becker, The Shifting Public Order of the Oceans: Freedom of Navigation and the 
Interdiction of Ships at Sea, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 131, 142 (2005). 
 91.  SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2012, supra note 6, at 208. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. at 209. 
 94.  For example, it is almost impossible for a private security company to obtain permission for 
its employees to carry weapons in Singapore.  Carolin Liss, The Privatisation of Maritime Security—
Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Between a Rock and a Hard Place? 16 (Asia Research Ctr., 
Working Paper No. 141, 2007). 
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only allow certain types of weapons.95  Due to the complex web of legal 
requirements relating to the carriage and transport of arms, some PMSCs 
are dumping weapons at sea to avoid violating arms regulations when 
calling at ports or disembarking at a final destination.96  PMSCs also avoid 
coastal state regulations by stocking “floating armories” on the high seas.97  
This arrangement allows their personnel to embark on the ship without 
weapons but to obtain the required weapons once outside of territorial 
waters.98 
On the other hand, some coastal states have embraced the profit 
opportunity associated with the recent rise of the PMSC industry and ship 
owners’ interest in securing armed protection when travelling through 
pirate-infested waters.  For example, Djibouti sells annual permits to 
PMSCs for $150,000 (or more) to allow them to operate from its ports with 
weapons.99  Djibouti also has a program whereby PMSCs can pay to rent 
and embark government-owned weapons—including fully automatic 
firearms.100  Sri Lanka runs a similar program from its port in Galle, 
allowing PMSCs to rent government-owned weapons—again including 
fully automatic firearms.101  PMSCs wishing to rent the weapons must also 
agree to embark a retired or off-duty Sri Lankan military officer to monitor 
the use of weapons on board the ship.102  Yemen has taken a different 
approach, renting out its own military personnel to escort ships travelling 
through the Gulf of Aden.103 
Armed convoy escort vessels are another option offered by some 
PMSCs to their private clients seeking individualized counter-piracy 
services.104  PMSCs offering this service generally rely on small vessels 
armed with small crews to conduct these escorts.105  Some companies, 
though, have grander plans.  For example, reports indicate that one private 
company, Typhon, will offer the services of three large boats, each fitted 
with machine guns and manned with 40 guards carrying rifles.106  Both the 
 
 95.  See SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2012, supra note 6, at 209 (noting that armed guards aboard 
German-flagged ships cannot carry semi-automatic rifles). 
 96.  Id. at 210. 
 97.  BROWN, supra note 7, at 5. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2012, supra note 6, at 210. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. at 210–11. 
 104.  Id. at 207. 
 105.  Spearin, supra note 81, at 828. 
 106.  Martin Plaut, Private Patrol Boats to Tackle Somali Pirates, BBC News, BBC.COM (May 30, 
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smaller and larger escort vessels operate by accompanying the client’s ship 
on its travels and challenging any suspicious boats that attempt to approach 
so as to deter any potential attacks.107  One advantage for ship owners 
choosing to employ armed convoy escort vessels is that the owners 
seemingly avoid the difficulties and legal issues associated with carrying 
weapons on board since the escort vessels operate separately from the 
client’s ship.108 
In addition to PMSCs, however, some governments hire out their 
naval or military personnel to provide security for commercial ships 
travelling through the Indian Ocean.109  Known as vessel protection 
detachments, or VPDs, these privately hired military teams also offer 
armed protection against pirate attacks.110  For example, the Netherlands 
does not permit its shipping companies to employ PMSCs, citing concerns 
that allowing private guards would undermine the state’s monopoly on the 
use of force.111  Accordingly, in 2011, it began offering VPDs to its ship 
owners, half of the cost of which is borne by the private shipping 
company.112  Several other states, including France, Spain, Israel, and Italy, 
have also hired out their military personnel to guard merchant vessels 
flying the state’s flag.113 
Indeed, the fact that Italy hired out some of its marines to help guard 
the Italian ship MV Enrica Lexie as it was travelling from Singapore to 
Egypt in early 2012 became international news.114  Two of those Italian 
marines were arrested by Indian authorities for having shot two Indian 
 
2012, 04:06 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18209357. 
 107.  BROWN, supra note 7, at 8. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. at 9. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. at 9–10. 
 112.  Justin Stares, The Need for Armed Guards Proves Governments have Failed to Tackle Piracy, 
DEF. MGMT. (Feb. 28, 2012), https://web.archive.org/web/20121114131259/http:/www 
.defencemanagement.com/feature_story.asp?id=18807.  The cost of hiring VPDs, however, so exceeds 
the cost of hiring private armed guards employed with PMSCs that some Dutch ship owners simply 
skirt the law and hire private guards from PMSCs.  Id.; see also Dutch Shipowner to Flag Out over Ban 
on Armed Guards, INTERMANAGER (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.intermanager.org/2011/11/dutch-
shipowner-to-flag-out-over-ban-on-armed-guards/ (reporting that one Dutch ship owner planned to 
register his ships in another state because Dutch laws forbid hiring armed guards from PMSCs).  In July 
2012, the Dutch Minister of Defense announced that the government was reducing the cost to ship 
owners of hiring these VPDs.  Defence Organisation makes Security for Merchant Shipping Cheaper, 
NETH. MINISTRY OF DEF.  (July 13, 2012, 17:59), http://www.defensie.nl/english/latest/news/2012/07/ 
13/48197582/Defence_organisation_makes_security_for_merchant_shipping_cheaper. 
 113.  FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 2012 REPORT, supra note 7, ¶ 25. 
 114.  E.g., Indian Police Detain Italian Navy Security Guards, BBC News, BBC.COM (Feb. 19, 
2012, 23:38 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-17093224. 
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fishermen the marines believed to be pirates.115  The marines were 
thereafter detained and arrested on murder charges despite Italy’s argument 
that they enjoyed immunity from foreign prosecution as agents of the 
Italian state.116  Nevertheless, industry witnesses strongly prefer VPDs over 
hiring guards employed with PMSCs, in part because they believe that state 
military personnel will be properly trained and responsive to authority.117  
Some also believe that military personnel can more easily move weapons 
through ports and that their legal status, which is more defined than that of 
private contractors, will protect them against foreign prosecutions should 
their actions cause any injury or death.118  Of course, the Enrica Lexie 
incident should serve as a warning that even military personnel hired out as 
part of VPDs have no certain status entitling them to immunity from 
foreign arrest and prosecution. 
B. The Risks and Difficulties Associated with Allowing Ship Owners to 
Hire Private Armed Guards 
Only a few years ago, industry organizations and states were generally 
opposed to the idea of private armed guards, preferring to allow only naval 
fleets to provide anti-piracy protection.119  A major criticism of the use of 
armed guards on commercial ships emphasizes the risk of escalating 
violence.120  Piracy has already become more violent over the last several 
years, and pirates who know that ships are prepared to use lethal weapons 
to repel attacks may respond more forcefully.121  The United Kingdom’s 
Dr. Campbell McCafferty, Head of Counter-Terrorism and UK Operational 
Policy at the Ministry of Defense, explained that the presence of armed 
 
 115.  Id. 
 116. Amrutha Gayathri, Enrica Lexie: Italy Urges India to Release Detained Marines, INT’L BUS. 
TIMES (Mar. 12, 2012, 6:26 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/enrica-lexie-italy-urges-india-release-
detained-marines-423740; India Allows Italian Ship Enrica Lexie to Leave, BBC News, BBC.COM (May 
2, 2012, 04:56 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-17920840; Mike Schuler, Italy and 
India Stand Off Over MV Enrica Lexie Incident, GCAPTAIN (Feb. 21, 2012), http://gcaptain.com/italy-
india-standoff-enrica-lexie/. 
 117.  FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 2012 REPORT 2012, supra note 7, ¶ 25. 
 118.  See, e.g., Piracy Against U.S. Flag Vessels: Lessons Learned: Hearing before the Subcomm. 
on Coast Guard & Mar. Transp. Of the H. Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, 111th Cong. 2 (2009) 
[hereinafter Volkle Testimony] (statement of Arthur J. Volkle, Jr., Vice President of American Cargo 
Transport, Inc.), available at http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/Testimony-Arthur_Volkle,Jr-
American_Cargo_Transport.pdf (“Military security avoids regulatory shortfalls, liability concerns, and 
international reluctance to permit armed merchant vessels into their ports.”). 
 119.  See FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 2012 REPORT, supra note 7, ¶ 26. 
 120.  Id. ¶ 27. 
 121.  ARABELLA THORP, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, STANDARD NOTE SN06237, PREVENTING 
AND PROSECUTING PIRACY AT SEA: LEGAL ISSUES 11 (Feb. 28, 2012), available at 
http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN06237. 
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guards on ships may not only lead to an escalation of violence but may also 
“just encourage pirates, in acts of desperation, to arm themselves more.”122  
Other commentators are willing to assume that having armed security on 
board may actually deter pirates from striking that particular ship so as to 
avoid a potentially deadly fight.123  They point out, however, that other 
ships without such protection may then be especially and unfairly 
vulnerable to pirate attacks.124 
Ship owners that hire private armed guards also face the additional 
complication of having to comply with flag and port state regulations on 
the carriage and transport of weapons.125  For example, South Africa 
recently announced that it will not allow ships travelling through its waters 
to carry private armed guards; only military personnel will be allowed to 
provide protection on ships.126  In Seychelles, police board commercial 
ships and lock the weapons armory.127  In Mauritius, ships must release any 
onboard weapons to the local police to be stored.128  In fact, some 
commentators have described the need to comply with varying and shifting 
state weapons laws as one of the greatest burdens faced by ships seeking to 
use armed security personnel for protection and the reason why some 
private security companies are stocking “floating armories” on the high 
seas.129  Yet such “floating armories” operate in a legal gray area without 
any international or national regulations governing their use, resulting in 
concerns that the companies using them are not applying minimum safety 
standards when storing arms and ammunition.130  Estimates as of mid-2012 
indicate that approximately 18 vessels were operating as “floating 
armories” on the high seas,131 carrying approximately 7,000 weapons.132 
 
 122.  FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 2012 REPORT, supra note 7, ¶ 27. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. ¶ 28. 
 125.  See Volkle Testimony, supra note 118, at 3–4 (describing the challenges of complying with 
multiple licensing schemes); FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 2012 REPORT, supra note 7, ¶ 41 (same). 
 126.  Aislinn Laing, South Africa Wrecks UK Anti-Piracy Plan, DAILY TELEGRAPH (UK), Apr. 23, 
2012, at 16. 
 127.  Mark Lowe, Floating Armouries, MAR. SECURITY REV. (Mar. 13, 2012), 
http://www.marsecreview.com/2012/03/floating-armouries/. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  See, e.g., Katharine Houreld, APNewsbreak: Piracy Fighters Using Floating Armories, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 22, 2012, 12:00 PM ET), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2012-
03/D9TLKOVO0.htm; Issues Arising from the Use of Armed Guards, supra note 82. 
 130.  U.N. Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, Rep., transmitted by letter dated July 11, 
2012 from the Chair of the Security Council Comm. established pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 
1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council, Annex 
5.4, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. S/2012/544 (July 13, 2012) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. S/2012/544]. 
 131.  Id. ¶ 9. 
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There are additional reasons to be wary of wholly embracing private 
armed guards as the potential solution to the maritime piracy problem. 
Although guards may be able to repel attacks, concerns have been raised 
about “cowboy” security companies engaging in illegal activities.133  The 
evidence suggests, for example, that the PMSCs are operating the “floating 
armories,” causing potential threats to lives, peace, and security by not 
properly securing those weapons.134  By contrast, when the Netherlands 
hires out its VPDs, it makes arrangements for the legal transport of 
weapons.  For example, Singapore has agreed that the Netherlands’ VPDs 
may store weapons in Singapore’s port.135 
Others argue that untrained guards operating on the high seas are 
shooting indiscriminately and unnecessarily killing pirates and innocent 
fishermen.136  Indeed, the belief that government military personnel are 
well-trained and prepared to act lawfully or face the necessary 
consequences is one reason why some industry representatives and states 
have shown a preference for using them in the fight against piracy.137  After 
all, as Admiral Baumgartner pointed out in his testimony before Congress, 
when one brings armed guards on board a vessel, one must make sure they 
are “fully qualified . . . [and that they have a] well thought-out, well-
coordinated and rehearsed practice method” of using their weapons.138  Yet 
not all private guards are necessarily well-trained,139 and in any event, 
private guards do not operate under a military chain of command or subject 
to military discipline when hired to protect an individual ship. 
In addition, no international standard governs the level of force that 
guards may use to repel a pirate attack.  Generally speaking, because 
 
 132.  Id. ¶ 4. 
 133.  FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 2012 REPORT, supra note 7,  ¶ 39; see also Alice Priddy & 
Stuart Casey-Maslen, Counter-Piracy Operations by Private Maritime Security Contractors: Key Legal 
Issues and Challenges, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 839, 842 (2012) (observing that all PMSCs may not be 
of the same professional caliber); Nikki Gee, Should Armed Guards Defend Ships Against Piracy, 
MOVER (June 27, 2011), http://www.themover.co.uk/international-news/2011/06/27/should-armed-
guards-defend-ships-against-piracy (quoting a representative of Royal United Services Institute for 
Defence and Security as questioning the trustworthiness of some private security companies). 
 134.  U.N. Doc. S/2012/544, supra note 130, ¶ 74. 
 135.  Singapore Supports Antipiracy Mission in Gulf of Aden, NETH. MINISTRY OF DEF. (Mar. 8, 
2012, 12:00), http://www.defensie.nl/english/latest/news/2012/03/08/48193981/Singapore_supports_ 
antipiracy_mission_in_Gulf_of_Aden. 
 136.  Bockmann & Katz, supra note 14. 
 137.  Volkle Testimony, supra note 118, at 2; FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 2012 REPORT, supra 
note 7, ¶ 25. 
 138.  International Piracy on the High Seas: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard and 
Mar. Transp. of the H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 111th Cong. 12 (Feb. 4, 2009) (statement 
of Rear Admiral William D. Baumgartner, Judge Advocate General, United States Coast Guard). 
 139.  Bockmann & Katz, supra note 14. 
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PMSC personnel are private citizens, they may only use lethal force to stop 
a pirate attack in self-defense or defense of others.140  Guards must look to 
flag state law and the law of the territories in which they operate to 
determine precisely what conduct by alleged pirates will suffice to trigger 
the right to respond with lethal force and what steps guards must take, if 
any, before responding with such force.141  Any use of excessive and 
unauthorized force will subject the guards to potential criminal and civil 
liability—in the flag state and in the state where they used force.142  Thus, 
at present, even if the guards are correct that any use of force was proper 
under the laws of the flag state, the territorial state could conclude that 
those same actions violated its laws. 
It is true that states sometimes waive their rights to assert jurisdiction 
over particular actors and conduct by way of grants of immunity.143  In the 
context of the fight against maritime piracy, such immunity probably only 
applies to military personnel acting in the course of their official duties.  
For example, states often enter into Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), 
which are treaties between states that typically grant the state sending 
military personnel into another state’s territory primary concurrent 
jurisdiction over offenses committed by its personnel while acting in the 
line of duty.144  But PMSC personnel are private citizens and therefore are 
 
 140.  Priddy & Casey-Maslen, supra note 133, at 844–45. 
 141.  See FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 2012 REPORT, supra note 7, ¶ 34 (stating that private 
armed security on vessels flagged in the United Kingdom must comply with UK laws on the use of 
force). 
 142.  General principles of international law also likely allow a state to exercise jurisdiction over 
crimes committed on the high seas that began on a ship flagged by another state but concluded on the 
state’s own flagged ship.  See Joseph William Davids, Jurisdiction and Diplomacy on the High Seas: 
India vs. Italy, {NEW} INT’L L. (Feb. 29, 2012, 10:59 PM), http://thenewinternationallaw.wordpress 
.com/2012/02/29/jurisdiction-and-diplomacy-on-the-high-seas-india-vs-italy/ (noting that Italy disputes 
India’s power to exercise jurisdiction over the Enrica Lexie marines if the shooting occurred on the high 
seas but suggesting that under international law, the “objective” territorial principle allows a state to 
exercise jurisdiction over crimes occurring on the high seas that began on another country’s flagged 
ship but ended on the state’s own flagged ship); see also Douglas Guilfoyle, Shooting Fisherman 
Mistaken for Pirates: Jurisdiction, Immunity, and State Responsibility, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 2, 2012), 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/shooting-fishermen-mistaken-for-pirates-jurisdiction-immunity-and-state-
responsibility/ (explaining a general principle of international law that an “offence commenced on a 
vessel of flag State A which has fatal consequences aboard the vessel of flag State B can be subject to 
the criminal law of both A and B.”). 
 143.  See generally Joseph William.Davids, India v. Italy Part Four: Functional Immunity, {NEW} 
INT’L L. (June 26, 2012, 10:59 PM), http://thenewinternationallaw.wordpress.com/2012/06/18/india-v-
italy-part-four-functional-immunity/ (describing the origins of functional immunity). 
 144.  David Scheffer, The Constitutionality of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 983, 1013 (2008); see also Richard J. Erickson, Status of Forces 
Agreements: A Sharing of Sovereign Prerogative, 37 A.F. L. REV. 137, 139–40 (1994) (describing the 
U.S. practice of entering into SOFAs). 
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not entitled to special immunity from foreign suits should they use 
excessive force to repel what they believe is a pirate attack.145 
Even so, the outcome of the Enrica Lexie shooting incident shows that 
military personnel hired out in their private capacity may not be granted 
immunity from another state’s exercise of criminal jurisdiction over their 
activities either.  That shooting involved trained Italian marines who were 
part of a government-offered VPD but whom the Indian government claims 
killed innocent fishermen without provocation.146  On the question of 
jurisdiction, the Italian government has argued that the marines are entitled 
to functional immunity from foreign prosecution because they were acting 
as an organ of the Italian state and because the shooting occurred in 
international waters.147  The Indian government has rejected that argument, 
asserting instead that it has jurisdiction over the shooting offense because 
the marines shot Indians on an Indian boat.148  The Italian government 
recently settled civil charges brought on behalf of the dead fisherman—for 
reported sums of $180,000 each.149  As of mid-December 2012, however, 
criminal charges against the two marines remained pending.150  
Accordingly, the Enrica Lexie incident demonstrates that not all states will 
necessarily conclude that military personnel hired to provide private 
protection for a commercial vessel are immune from prosecution for 
violating the state’s criminal laws. 
Finally, adding private armed guards to a ship can create additional 
issues about when, and how, the use of force may be authorized and who 
may be liable for any excessive use of force.151  On the one hand, the armed 
guards are tasked with repelling pirate attacks and likely believe that a 
decision on whether to use lethal force should rest with the security team.152 
 
 145.  See Priddy & Casey-Maslen, supra note 133, at 844–45 (noting that PMSCs are private 
citizens and thus subject to criminal prosecution if they use unlawful force). 
 146.  Alan Katz, Brother Shot Dead Fishing Tests Armed Guards’ Accountability, BLOOMBERG 
(Nov. 28, 2012, 7:01 PM ET), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-29/brother-shot-dead-fishing-
tests-armed-guards-accountability.html. 
 147.  Gayathri, supra note 116; Hari Sankar, Jurisdictional and Immunity Issues in the Story of 
Enrica Lexie: Shoot & Scoot Turns Around!, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/ 
jurisdictional-and-immunity-issues-in-the-story-of-enrica-lexie-a-case-of-shoot-scoot-turns-around/. 
 148.  Sankar, supra note 147. 
 149.  Katz, supra note 146. 
 150.  Enrica Lexie Case: Italy Summons Indian Envoy, SIFYNEWS (Dec. 14, 2012, 17:36), 
http://www.sify.com/news/enrica-lexie-case-italy-summons-indian-envoy-news-international-
mmoqPsjhbei.html. 
 151.  See Issues Arising from the Use of Armed Guards, supra note 82 (describing the need for 
clear Rules of Engagement, the prudence of informing various parties of the intent to hire private 
guards, and the possibilities of liability in the event of a hijacking). 
 152.  Id. (noting that the security team may contractually have discretion over whether and when 
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On the other hand, international regulations and longstanding practice rest 
ultimate authority for the safety of life at sea with the ship’s captain.153  
Further, there is reason to believe many captains would not be comfortable 
ceding such authority, a point made by Captain Richard Phillips, whose 
ship, the Maersk Alabama, was attacked by pirates.  Before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, he stated: “I am not comfortable giving up 
command authority to others . . . including the commander of a protection 
force.  In the heat of an attack, there can be only one final decision 
maker.”154  Yet, if command authority is not agreed on clearly and in 
advance, chaos could ensue during a pirate attack, and attempts to shift 
blame would likely follow any assertions that the force used exceeded what 
was necessary. 
C. The Maritime Industry’s Evolving Stance on Private Armed Guards 
For many of the reasons discussed above, until 2011 the maritime 
industry generally opposed the use of private armed guards on ships.155  
Naval forces were charged with providing the bulk of anti-piracy 
protection, and individual ships were encouraged to assist in deterring 
piratical acts by following the industry’s “best management practices”—a 
set of guidelines outlining a host of primarily passive defensive 
measures.156  For example, the guidelines cautioned ships to install, among 
 
lethal force is used). 
 153.  According to the IMO’s International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 
Regulation 34-1, “[t]he owner, the charterer, the company operating the ship as defined in regulation 
IX/1, or any other person shall not prevent or restrict the master of the ship from taking or executing 
any decision which, in the master’s professional judgment, is necessary for the safety of life at sea and 
protection of the marine environment.”  United Nations International Convention for the Safety of Life 
at Sea, Annex, Ch. V, Regulation 34-1, concluded Nov. 1, 1974, 34 U.S.T. 47 (amended by M.S.C. Res. 
153(78) (May 20, 2004)), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/432aca724.pdf.  This same 
idea is echoed in the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS), which was implemented 
in 2004 as part of a new SOLAS chapter to enhance maritime security.  The ISPS requires that the 
captain have the ultimate responsibility for the safety and security of the ship. See Diplomatic 
Conference on Maritime Security, IMO, International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, Annex I, 
Part B, sec. 4.10, IMO Doc. SOLAS/CONF.5/24 (Dec. 12, 2002). 
 154.  Confronting Piracy off the Coast of Somalia: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Foreign 
Relations, 111th Cong. 6 (2009) (statement of Captain Richard Phillips, Master of the Maersk 
Alabama). 
 155.  See, e.g., IMO, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Recommendations to Governments 
for Preventing and Suppressing Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, Annex ¶ 4, IMO Doc. 
MSC.1/Circ. 1333 (June 26, 2009) (noting concerns about having to comply with state laws on weapons 
carriage and the risks associated with having weapons around flammable or dangerous cargo); id. ¶ 7 
(discussing the risks of escalating violence if weapons are allowed on board ships). 
 156.  See, e.g., IMO, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Waters off the Coast of Somalia: 
Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy off the Coast of Somalia and in the Arabian Sea Area 
Developed by the Industry, Annex II, ¶ 6.11, IMO Doc. MSC.1/Circ. 1337 (Aug. 4, 2010) [hereinafter 
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other things, alarms, motion detectors, and closed circuit televisions, so as 
to be warned of imminent attacks.157  The guidelines also counseled ships 
on the use of non-lethal defensive tools, such as high-powered fire hoses 
and razor wire barriers that can repel pirates trying to board a ship.158  In 
addition, suggested best management practices prompted ships to register 
with international and regional monitoring agencies so that navies and 
other government-sponsored counter-piracy teams would be able to provide 
assistance if needed.159 
The fact that the world’s navies were unable to protect every ship 
from experiencing an act of piracy, however, resulted in ship owners 
calling for the right to hire private armed guards to accompany them when 
travelling through pirate-infested waters.160  Those calls were essentially 
heeded in early 2011 when the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), 
which represents national ship owners’ associations from over 30 countries, 
announced that it had changed its previous stance opposing the use of 
armed guards on ships.161  Instead, it concluded that the decision as to 
whether armed security can participate in the fight against maritime piracy 
should be a matter for flag states to decide.162  The ICS chairman 
explained: 
 
  ICS has had to acknowledge that the decision to engage armed guards, 
whether military or private, is a decision to be made by the ship operator 
after due consideration of all of the risks, and subject to the approval of 
the vessel’s flag state and insurers.  The consensus view amongst 
shipping industry associations remains that, in normal circumstances, 
private armed guards are not recommended, and are a clear second best 
to military personnel.  However, in view of the current crisis in the 
 
Circ. 1337] (revoking and replacing Circular 1335) (“The use of additional private security guards is at 
the discretion of the company, but the use of armed guards is not recommended.”); IMO, Piracy and 
Armed Robbery against Ships in Waters off the Coast of Somalia: Best Management Practices to Deter 
Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Coast of Somalia, Annex II, at 4, IMO Doc. MSC.1/Circ. 1335 
(Sept. 29, 2009) [hereinafter Circ. 1335] (stating that ships could hire private security but that “the use 
of armed guards is not recommended”). 
 157.  Circ. 1337, supra note 156, Annex II, § 9; Circ. 1335, supra note 156, Annex II, at 7. 
 158.  Circ. 1337, supra note 156, Annex II, § 9; Circ. 1335, supra note 156, Annex II, at 7. 
 159.  E.g., Circ. 1337, supra note 156, Annex II, § 6; Circ. 1335, supra note 156, Annex III, at 1; 
see also FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 2012 REPORT, supra note 7, ¶ 24 (generally describing some 
best management practice guidelines); Lang Report, supra note 24, ¶ 34 (describing best management 
practices as defined by the maritime community). 
 160.  FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 2012 REPORT, supra note 7, ¶ 25. 
 161.  ICS Changes Position on Using Armed Guards to Protect Ships against Pirates, MARINELOG 
(Feb. 15, 2011), http://www.marinelog.com/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=505:ics-
changes-position-on-using-armed-guards-to-protect-ships-against-pirates&Itemid=231. 
 162.  Id. 
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Indian Ocean—with over 700 seafarers held hostage and, most recently, 
a seafarer being executed—ship operators must be able to retain all 
possible options available to deter attacks and defend their crews against 
piracy.  Many shipping companies have concluded that arming ships is a 
necessary alternative to avoiding the Indian Ocean completely, which 
would have a hugely damaging impact on the movement of world 
trade.163 
 
The IMO followed the ICS by issuing a series of Circulars beginning 
in May 2011 that cautiously endorsed a regime whereby flag states would 
be able to decide whether and under what circumstances armed security 
personnel should be allowed on their ships.  In its guidance, the IMO 
emphasized that the use of private armed security should not be considered 
an alternative to best management practices and other, more passive, 
measures to defend against pirate attacks.164  It also emphasized the need to 
minimize the risks associated with placing armed guards on ships through 
the use of clear flag state policies.  In particular, the IMO encouraged flag 
states to develop and employ: (1) a process for authorizing ship owners’ 
use of private guards, (2) mechanisms for ensuring accountability with the 
terms and conditions under which any authorization to hire guards would 
be granted, (3) information about the lawful carriage and use of firearms by 
private guards, (4) guidance on command authority as between the captain 
and any armed security, and (5) reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements.165  By September 2011, shipping industry representatives had 
drafted an updated version of the best management practices (BMP4) 
similarly acknowledging that whether to use armed guards on “merchant 
vessels is a matter for individual ship operators to decide following their 
own voyage risk assessment and approval of respective Flag States.”166 
In May 2012, in an effort to enrich existing advice, the IMO also 
issued interim guidance to PMSCs.167  That guidance, among other things, 
encourages PMSCs to acknowledge the need to operate according to flag 
state and other applicable laws.168  It recommends that firms only hire out 
 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Circ. 1405, supra note 11, Annex, ¶ 1. 
 165.  Circ. 1406, supra note 11, Annex, at 1–2.  For the IMO’s updated recommendations, see 
IMO, Revised Interim Guidance for Flag States Regarding the Use of Privately Contracted Armed 
Security Personnel on board Ships in the High Risk Area, IMO Doc. MSC.1/Circ. 1406/Rev. 2 (May 
25, 2012). 
 166.  IMO, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Waters off the Coast of Somalia: Best 
Management Practices for Protection against Somalia Based Piracy, at 2, IMO Doc. MSC.1/Circ. 1339 
(Sept. 14, 2011) [hereinafter BMP4] (revoking and replacing Circular 1337 from 2010). 
 167.  Circ. 1443, supra note 7. 
 168.  Id. Annex, ¶ 1.3. 
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personnel who are trained to operate in a maritime context and that the 
firms carry adequate insurance to cover any claims that might arise as a 
result of their employees’ conduct.169  The guidance cautions that personnel 
acting as armed guards must abide by flag state and other laws regarding 
the carriage and use of firearms and to also recognize that laws regarding 
the use of lethal force vary from state to state.170  In addition, the guidance 
further recommends that PMSCs respect that the captain is in control of the 
ship.171 
IV. PRIVATE ARMED GUARDS ON SHIPS: A COMPARISON OF 
SOME FLAG STATE APPROACHES 
As the above discussion indicates, whether to allow private armed 
guards on ships to assist in the fight against maritime piracy is a complex 
question.  It is also one to which the answers of flag states differ.172  Even 
after the ICS and IMO withdrew their objections to armed guards in 2011, 
some states have remained opposed to the idea.  Indonesia, for instance, has 
stated that it will consistently oppose proposals to allow recruiting private 
armed security guards on ships because of, among other things, the absence 
of national and international legal instruments governing their hiring and 
conduct.173  As noted above, the Netherlands’ policy only allows Dutch 
flagged ships to be protected by military personnel that the country hires 
out to commercial ship owners.174 
Many states, though, have recently changed their laws, or are 
considering changing them, to allow their ship owners to hire private armed 
guards.175  The United Kingdom is a good example of a state that recently 
reversed its stance on the issue.  In July 2011, the government strongly 
discouraged the use of private armed guards and instead backed naval 
 
 169.  Id. Annex, ¶¶ 1.5, 3.4, 3.8. 
 170.  Id. Annex, ¶¶ 3.3, 5.13. 
 171.  Id. Annex, ¶ 5.6. 
 172.  See INT’L CHAMBER OF SHIPPING [ICS] & EUROPEAN CMTY. SHIPOWNERS ASS’NS [ECSA], 
COMPARISON OF FLAG STATE LAWS ON ARMED GUARDS AND ARMS ON BOARD (2013), available at 
http://www.ics-shipping.org/docs/default-source/Piracy-Docs/comparison-of-flag-state-laws-on-armed-
guards-and-arms-on-board.pdf [hereinafter ICS Flag State Comparison]. 
 173.  Ridwan Max Sijabat, RI Says No to Private Armed Guards aboard Vessels, JAKARTA POST 
(June 13, 2012, 10:40 AM), http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/06/13/ri-says-no-private-armed-
guards-aboard-vessels.html. 
 174.  Stares, supra note 112. 
 175.  See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 7, at 17 (reporting that since 2011 India, Liberia, Panama, 
Greece, Norway, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Egypt, and the Philippines have changed their laws to 
allow for private armed security on board their ships and that several other countries are considering 
doing the same). 
DUTTON MACRO CLEAN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2014  1:16 PM 
132 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 24:107 
patrols and the use of best management practices on board ships.176  On 
October 30, 2011, however, the Prime Minister announced that the UK 
would allow its ship owners to hire private security forces.177  The Written 
Ministerial Statement that followed in December explained that guards 
would be allowed under “exceptional circumstances” and only when the 
ship is travelling in the areas posing the highest risk of pirate attacks.178  
Other states, including Cyprus,179 Denmark,180 and Greece,181 have also 
changed their laws since 2011 to allow for armed security on board their 
flagged ships.  In June 2011, Norway announced a new framework for the 
use of armed security personnel on its ships.182  Belgium,183 France,184 
Germany,185 and Japan186 are among the states that have indicated they are 
 
 176.  FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 2012 REPORT, supra note 7, ¶ 31. 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Id. ¶ 32. 
 179.  ICS Flag State Comparison, supra note 172, at 2 (reporting that Cyprus has passed a bill 
allowing for armed guards); see also Cyprus: Ships Need Armed Guards, MARITIMESECURITY.ASIA 
(May 18, 2012), http://maritimesecurity.asia/free-2/piracy-2/cyprus-ships-need-armed-guards/ 
(reporting that Cypriot lawmakers were discussing a bill to allow private armed guards on board 
Cyprus-flagged ships). 
 180.  Piracy, Policies and Strategies, DANISH MAR. AUTH., http://www.dma.dk/Policy/Sider/Piracy 
.aspx (last visited Sept. 20, 2013) (stating that Denmark now allows ships to employ armed guards 
under some circumstances). 
 181. Greek Parliament Ratifies Legislation Introducing Armed Guards aboard Vessels, SHIPPING 
HERALD: THE MAR. PORTAL (Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.shippingherald.com/Admin/ArticleDetail/ 
tabid/94/ArticleID/3481/Greek-Parliament-ratifies-legislation-introducing-armed-guards-aboard-
vessels.aspx. 
 182.  National Regulations on the Use of Armed Guards, SKULD, https://extranet.skuld.com/Insight/ 
Piracy/Armed-Guards/National-regulations-on-the-use-of-armed-guards/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2013). 
 183.  Belgium Moves to Regulate Vessels’ Private Armed Guards, LLOYD’S LIST (May 18, 2012, 
12:59), http://www.lloydslist.com/ll/sector/ports-and-logistics/article398587.ece. 
 184.  ICS Flag State Comparison, supra note 172, at 3.  Until 2012, France only allowed its ships 
to be guarded by military teams provided by the state.  But under pressure from ship owners, France is 
drafting a law to allow them to employ guards from PMSCs.  Id.; see also Valerie Gabard, Privately 
Contracted Armed Security Personnel and Counter-Piracy: Is France at a Turning Point?, COMMUNIS 
HOSTIS OMNIUM (Apr. 17, 2012), http://piracy-law.com/2012/04/17/privately-contracted-armed-
security-personnel-and-counter-piracy-is-france-at-a-turning-point/. 
 185.  See ICS Flag State Comparison, supra note 172, at 3 (stating that the German government 
has drafted a bill to allow ships to hire private armed guards to serve on commercial ships under certain 
circumstances); Germany Seeks EU Support of Plan to Combat Piracy, EDMONTON J., Aug. 24, 2011, 
at C.2, available at http://www2.canada.com/edmontonjournal/news/business/story.html?id=4517f027-
8d8c-46a4-80b3-72ecb0b59b06 (reporting that the German government was considering changing its 
laws to allow its ships to carry private armed security personnel in areas that pose a high risk of pirate 
attacks). 
 186.  Antipiracy Bill Drafted to let Private Armed Guards Defend Ships, THE JAPAN TIMES, Feb. 4, 
2013, available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/02/04/national/antipiracy-bill-drafted-to-let-
private-armed-guards-defend-ships/#.Uj0eZWTwJMI (reporting that Japan has a new draft law to allow 
its ships to carry private armed security guards under some circumstances). 
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considering implementing new laws to permit private armed guards. 
But under what circumstances are states allowing these private actors 
to participate in a fight that was until recently reserved for military 
personnel operating as part of a United Nations-sanctioned mission? Are 
states regulating, licensing, or monitoring these private actors who will 
wield guns on the world’s shared oceans?  Are they regulating how these 
private actors carry and transport weapons or specifying permissible 
sources from which the guards may obtain their weapons?  Are states 
providing these private actors with any special guidance on the use of force 
or on who may authorize its use?  Even if individual states are regulating or 
providing guidance on any of these matters, are state policies coordinated 
and uniform?  After all, the fight against piracy occurs in an international 
arena.  Shouldn’t all states want to ensure that the private citizens engaging 
in actions once reserved for military personnel are subjected to some 
training and monitoring? 
This Article examines the laws and guidance of five different states as 
they relate to hiring armed guards to protect ships against pirate attacks in 
an effort to obtain some answers to these questions.  The first section 
identifies the states chosen for inclusion in the study and their general 
approaches toward regulating the use of private armed guards on ships 
travelling through pirate-infested waters.  The remaining sections compare 
and synthesize various aspects of the states’ laws and guidance to facilitate 
a discussion about whether the current approaches are sufficient to mitigate 
some of the risks associated with allowing private citizens to participate in 
the fight against piracy. 
A. Overview: States Included in the Study and Their General Approaches 
to Regulating the Use of Private Armed Guards 
This Article uses the laws and guidance of (1) the United States, (2) 
the United Kingdom, (3) Denmark, (4) Norway, and (5) Singapore to 
explore some approaches that states have taken to regulating the use of 
private armed guards on their ships.  There are several reasons for focusing 
on these five states.  First, these states all have strong shipping interests.  
As of December 2010, the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway, 
Denmark, and Singapore were each listed among the states with parent 
companies owning the top twenty controlled merchant fleets in terms of 
gross tonnage.187  Second, including the United States and the United 
 
 187.  IMO, International Shipping Facts and Figures – Information Resources on Trade, Safety, 
Security, Environment § 3.7 (Mar. 6, 2012), available at http://www.imo.org/KnowledgeCentre/ 
ShipsAndShippingFactsAndFigures/TheRoleandImportanceofInternationalShipping/Documents/Interna
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Kingdom in the study is important, as both are states from which a number 
of PMSCs hail—meaning that both should have a relatively great interest in 
regulating PMSC conduct.188  Third, these states authorize the use of 
private armed guards in different ways, thus facilitating a later comparison 
of approaches and a discussion of their strengths and weaknesses.  Finally, 
as a practical matter, information about these states’ laws and guidance is 
available in English, thereby obviating the need to translate from another 
language. 
Although each of these states has authorized the use of private armed 
guards on board their commercial ships while travelling through pirate-
infested waters, the timing and nature of their commitment to the idea 
differ in some respects.  For example, the United States’ acceptance of 
private armed guards seems relatively long-standing and also quite strong.  
The United States has authorized personnel on commercial ships to use 
force to defend against maritime pirate attacks for more than one hundred 
years.  According to 33 U.S.C. § 383, which is entitled “Resistance of 
pirates by merchant vessels,” the commander and crew of any merchant 
vessels owned in whole or in part by a United States citizen may defend 
against any attack by another private armed vessel.189  How much and what 
kind of force civilians may use to repel pirate attacks is a topic that is 
addressed by reference to general law in the area, rather than by any 
specific language in Section 383.  To provide more exact guidance on the 
topic in the piracy context, in 2009 the United States Coast Guard and the 
Department of Homeland Security jointly issued a Port Security Advisory 
entitled Guidance on Self-Defense and Defense of Others by U.S. Flagged 
Commercial Vessels Operating in High Risk Waters.190  That 2009 Self-
Defense Advisory “restates existing law” and clarifies the rules to be 
followed by all vessel personnel, including private security guards, when 
defending against pirate attacks.191 
 
tional%20Shipping%20-%20Facts%20and%20Figures.pdf. 
 188.  BROWN, supra note 7, at 6 (stating that most contractors are British or American); Erwin, 
supra note 8 (stating that about half of the PMSCs providing maritime security services are based in the 
United Kingdom). 
 189.  33 U.S.C. § 383 (2012) (original version at R.S. § 4295, enacted as Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 
77, § 3, 3 Stat. 513). 
 190.  U.S. COAST GUARD, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PORT SECURITY ADVISORY (3-09): 
GUIDANCE ON SELF-DEFENSE OR DEFENSE OF OTHERS BY U.S. FLAGGED COMMERCIAL VESSELS 
OPERATING IN HIGH RISK WATERS (June 18, 2009) [hereinafter PORT SECURITY ADVISORY 3-09].  Port 
Security Advisory 3-09 specifically states that it anticipates its guidance to apply to contracted security 
personnel who will serve as guards on or will provide a security escort to a United States vessel while 
stationed on an accompanying vessel that is flagged by the United States but that is not a government 
vessel (such as a navy ship).  Id. at 1 n.1. 
 191.  Id. at 1 (stating that the guidance does not establish new standards or duties regarding the 
DUTTON MACRO CLEAN(DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2014  1:16 PM 
2013] GUNSLINGERS ON THE HIGH SEAS 135 
March 2012 remarks by Andrew Shapiro, Assistant Secretary of the 
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, further demonstrate the United States’ 
commitment to using private armed guards.192  Mr. Shapiro explained that 
the United States permits its commercial vessels to carry private armed 
security teams.193  Because of the seriousness of the threat posed by 
maritime piracy to the safety of international ships, crews, and cargo, the 
United States has also encouraged other countries to follow suit.194  Mr. 
Shapiro recognized that employing armed guards may involve some 
complicated issues.195  But he played down concerns of “cowboy” guards, 
saying that the evidence showed that most private armed guards act 
responsibly, only firing warning shots after using non-lethal methods, such 
as flares or loudspeakers, to scare pirates away.196  Regarding weapons 
carriage and transport, he stated that the United States has worked, and will 
continue to work, with other states to facilitate the legal movement of 
arms.197 
The United Kingdom and Denmark, by contrast, have only recently 
changed their previous stances, now allowing their ship owners to employ 
private armed guards.  As mentioned above, on October 30, 2011, Prime 
Minister David Cameron announced the United Kingdom’s decision to 
authorize the use of private armed guards under some circumstances.198  In 
announcing the change, the Prime Minister referred to the extent of 
hijackings for ransom around the Horn of Africa as a “stain” on the world 
that needed to be tackled.199  In December 2011, the government followed 
with a Written Ministerial Statement outlining the new policy in more 
detail.200  That Statement explained that private armed guards would only 
 
right to use self-defense or to defend others but instead provides examples to illustrate how defense 
principles might apply in the maritime piracy context). 
 192.  Andrew J. Shapiro, Asst. Sec’y, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Remarks to the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce: Expanding Private Sector Partnerships Against Piracy (Mar. 13, 2012), 
available at http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/185697.htm. 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  Id. 
 198.  FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 2012 REPORT, supra note 7, ¶ 21; Somali Piracy: Armed 
Guards to Protect UK Ships, BBC News, BBC.COM (Oct. 30, 2011, 15:21 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
news/uk-15510467. 
 199.  Thomas Penny, U.K. Ships Allowed Armed Guards Against Piracy, Cameron Says, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 30, 2011, 6:45 AM ET), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-30/u-k-ships-to-
carry-armed-guards-against-pirates-cameron-says.html. 
 200.  Written Statement to Parliament from Mike Penning, MP, Parliamentary Under-Sec’y of State 
for Transp., The Use of Private Armed Guards on board UK Registered Ships under Exceptional 
Circumstances to Defend against Piracy (Dec. 6, 2011), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/ 
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be permitted under “exceptional circumstances,” defined as where (1) the 
ship is transiting on the high seas through a specific area posing a high risk 
of pirate attacks,201 (2) the ship is following the latest IMO best 
management practices but has concluded that they are insufficient to 
protect it against a pirate attack, and (3) the use of armed guards is likely to 
reduce the risks to the lives of those travelling on board.202  Along with the 
Statement, the government published its Interim Guidance to UK Flagged 
Shipping on the Use of Armed Guards to Defend against the Threat of 
Piracy in Exceptional Circumstances.203  The Guidance sets out the 
government’s policy on the use of armed guards on board UK-flagged 
ships and the rules regarding the use of force, command responsibility, and 
the carriage and transport of arms.204 
The Danish government only yielded to ship owners’ requests to be 
allowed to hire armed guards for individualized protection in May 2011.205  
Prior to that time, the government had strongly opposed the use of private 
armed guards on board ships flying the Danish flag.206  It had been 
concerned about granting civilians the permission to use weapons in self-
defense and had feared that pirates would only escalate the violence they 
used to perpetrate their attacks if they knew that ships were carrying armed 
guards.207  Recognizing the increasing difficulty that the world’s navies 
were having in defending against pirate activities that now occur in an 
expanded geographical range, however, the government changed its 
policy.208  Nevertheless, the Danish government rejected ship owners’ 
requests to employ current military personnel as guards on their ships, 
stating that using scarce government resources would not be cost effective 
 
speeches/the-use-of-private-armed-guards-on-board-uk-registered-ships-under-exceptional-
circumstances-to-defend-against-piracy [hereinafter Penning Statement]. 
 201.  Id. (defining “high risk area” as “an area bounded by Suez and the Straits of Hormuz to the 
North”). 
 202.  Id. 
 203.  DEP’T FOR TRANSP., INTERIM GUIDANCE TO UK FLAGGED SHIPPING ON THE USE OF ARMED 
GUARDS TO DEFEND AGAINST THE THREAT OF PIRACY IN EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES (2011) 
(amended 2012), available at http://assets.dft.gov.uk/publications/use-of-armed-guards-to-defend-
against-piracy/use-of-armed-guards-to-defend-against-piracy.pdf [hereinafter JUNE 2012 INTERIM 
GUIDANCE]. 
 204.  Id. at 6, § 1. 
 205.  MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, MINISTRY OF DEF., MINISTRY OF 
ECON. AND BUS. AFFAIRS, STRATEGY FOR THE DANISH COUNTER-PIRACY EFFORT 2011–2014, at 25 
(May 2011), available at http://um.dk/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomacy/ 
Pirateristrategi_2011_ENG_WEB.PDF [hereinafter DANISH STRATEGY]. 
 206.  Id. 
 207.  Id. 
 208.  Id. 
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and would run counter to the interest in encouraging international 
cooperation to deter maritime piracy rather than forging a regime whereby 
each state protects only its own ship owners.209 
Although it has no general law permitting armed defense of its ships 
against pirate attacks, Norway has, since 2007, authorized the captain of a 
Norwegian ship to take actions to defend the vessel, including using private 
armed guards on board.210  In July 2011, the government amended its 
regulations on ship security and arms carriage to more specifically address 
the problem of maritime piracy by regulating ships’ usage of armed 
security when travelling in waters known to pose a high risk of pirate 
attacks.211  The government’s subsequently-issued Provisional Guidelines 
offer explanatory comments to aid ship owners in understanding the new 
regulations.212  According to those comments, the new regulations do not 
encourage the use of private armed security guards but are intended, 
instead, to regulate the selection and use of such guards so that the highest 
possible professional and ethical standards are followed when their services 
are used on Norwegian flagged vessels.213 
Finally, Singapore does not ban the use of private armed guards on its 
ships, but at the same time, its endorsement of their use appears cautious.214  
In its Shipping Circular dated September 18, 2012, Singapore advises that 
the use of armed guards should not be considered an alternative to the 
effective employment of best management practices or other more passive 
 
 209.  Id. at 24. 
 210.  See ICS Flag State Comparison, supra note 172, at 6; see also Norway Clarifies Ruling on 
Armed Guard Use, INTERMANAGER (July 1, 2011). http://www.intermanager.org/2011/07/norway-
clarifies-ruling-on-armed-guard-use/ (stating that Norway’s 2007 law addressed ship security but not 
the then-unknown threat posed by maritime piracy). 
 211.  NORWEGIAN MAR. DIRECTORATE, REGULATIONS CONCERNING AMENDMENTS TO THE 
REGULATIONS OF 22 JUNE 2004 NO. 972 CONCERNING PROTECTIVE SECURITY MEASURES ON BOARD 
SHIPS AND MOBILE OFFSHORE DRILLING UNITS (SAFETY REGULATIONS) (July 1, 2011) [hereinafter 
Norway Amended Safety Regulations], available at http://www.skuld.com/upload/News%20and%20 
Publications/Publications/Piracy/Regulations_concerning_amendments_to_the_Regulation_of_22_June
_2004_nr.972.pdf.  The new regulations are now entitled Regulations of 22 June 2004 No. 972 
Concerning Security, Anti-Terrorism and Anti-Piracy Measures and the Use of Force on board Ships 
and Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (the Security Regulations).  Id. 
 212.  NORWEGIAN MAR. DIRECTORATE, PROVISIONAL GUIDELINES—USE OF ARMED GUARDS ON 
BOARD NORWEGIAN SHIPS (July 2011), available at http://www.skuld.com/upload/News%20and%20 
Publications/Publications/Piracy/Provisional_guidelines_The_use_of_armed_guards_onboard_Norwegi
an_ships.pdf [hereinafter Norway Provisional Guidelines]. 
 213.  Id. at 2.  Recent figures indicate that about 30% of Norwegian vessels operating off the coast 
of Somalia have employed armed personnel from PMSCs to protect them against maritime piracy.  
Valeria Criscione, Norway Responds to Increased Piracy Attacks, NORTRADE.COM (Aug. 10, 2012), 
http://www.nortrade.com/sectors/articles/norway-responds-to-increased-piracy-attacks/. 
 214.  See ICS Flag State Comparison, supra note 172, at 6. 
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defensive measures to guard against maritime piracy.215  It also notes that 
the decision of whether to hire such armed security personnel is a matter 
for ship owners and operators.216  Nevertheless, it warns that the decision 
should be made “after a thorough risk assessment and after ensuring all 
other practical means of self protection have been employed.”217  Singapore 
refers ship owners and operators to the IMO’s Circular for a list of the 
factors and considerations that should guide such risk assessment.218 
The sections that follow explore and compare several specific aspects 
of the laws and guidance of these five states as they relate to the various 
risks that have been previously identified as being associated with 
permitting private guards to aid in the fight against piracy. 
B. Laws and Guidance to Regulate the PMSC Industry or Vet Guards 
One risk associated with using private armed guards in the fight 
against piracy is that not all will be well-trained and prepared to act in a 
lawful and proper manner when defending ships against attacks.  To the 
extent that states want to guard against such risks, they might regulate the 
PMSC industry or in some way vet the guards that ship owners are 
permitted to hire.  A review of the laws and guidance of the five states that 
are the subject of this study, however, indicates that at least these states are 
not willing to undertake such tasks.  For the most part, these states have 
gone on record and cautioned ship owners to be diligent when hiring 
guards but have otherwise made clear that they are not in the business of 
passing on the competence of the guards that their ship owners hire. 
For example, the United States warns ship owners that any security 
personnel hired by U.S. flagged ships must be fluent in English and must 
also meet certain training requirements enabling them to effectively defend 
the vessel and crew while in high risk waters and in accordance with the 
approved protection plan for the vessel.219  In addition, it cautions that any 
security personnel should be trained in the use of any firearms that they are 
carrying, weapons safety, and the lawful use of force in self-defense and 
 
 215.  MAR. AND PORT AUTH. OF SING., SHIPPING CIRCULAR NO. 15 OF 2012, at 1 (Sept. 18, 2012), 
available at http://www.mpa.gov.sg/sites/pdf/sc15-12.pdf.  Shipping Circular No. 15 replaces a similar 
Shipping Circular No. 11, which was issued in June 2011.  MAR. AND PORT AUTH. OF SING., SHIPPING 
CIRCULAR NO. 11 OF 2011 (June 10, 2011), available at http://www.mpa.gov.sg/sites/circulars_and_ 
notices/pdfs/shipping_circulars/sc_no_11_of_2011.pdf. 
 216.  Id. at 1–2. 
 217.  Id. 
 218.  Id. at 2. 
 219.  U.S. COAST GUARD, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PORT SECURITY ADVISORY (5-09) (REV 1): 
MINIMUM GUIDELINES FOR CONTRACTED SECURITY SERVICES IN HIGH RISK WATERS ¶¶ 7, 11 (July 24, 
2009) (referencing the training requirements in 33 C.F.R. 104.220 (2007)). 
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defense of others.220 
The United Kingdom only allows ship owners to hire armed guards if 
the owners file with the government a counter-piracy plan indicating why 
this extra level of protection, beyond following best management practices, 
is necessary.221  And it reminds ship owners that the presence of armed 
security personnel could lead to an escalation of violence.222  Nevertheless, 
the government notes that it has no accreditation process for PMSCs and 
warns ship owners to be “extra vigilant” in selecting the company from 
which to hire security personnel.223  The only other protection against the 
possibility of untrained, “cowboy” guards operating on the high seas is the 
government’s outline of the types of due diligence that ship owners should 
undertake when selecting a PMSC.224 
The new Danish counter-piracy strategy gives ship owners the 
possibility of applying for a firearms certificate to use armed security on 
board Danish ships as long as it is perceived necessary based on the general 
threat assessment for the area “and as long as the specifics of the case, also 
in terms of compliance with Best Management Practices, do not otherwise 
speak against it.”225  According to the government, the intention is to make 
the application process as flexible as possible, while at the same time 
“ensuring that no available personal data on the guards gives cause for 
concern when issuing a firearms certificate.”226  Ship owners must provide 
the government with various items of information to obtain the firearms 
certificate.  They must identify the PMSC and the specific guards they 
intend to hire and provide those guards’ certificates of criminal record, 
information on their training and experience in arms operation, and copies 
of any valid arms licenses.227  In addition, ship owners must identify the 
specific weapons to be brought on board the vessel and whether the arms 
will be carried out of and into Denmark.228  Nevertheless, Denmark does 
not oversee any vetting process for guards, instead leaving the ship owner 
 
 220.  Id. ¶ 7. 
 221.  JUNE 2012 INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 203, § 2.10. 
 222.  Id. § 2.7. 
 223.  Id. § 1.8. 
 224.  Id. § 3. 
 225.  DANISH STRATEGY, supra note 205, at 25. 
 226.  Id. 
 227.  CIVIL AND POLICE DEP’T, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, DOC. NO. IBM40881, INFORMATION THAT 
SHOULD ACCOMPANY A SHIPPING COMPANY’S APPLICATION FOR USING ARMED CIVILIAN GUARDS ON 
BOARD DANISH SHIPS, available at http://www.dma.dk/SiteCollectionDocuments/CMR/Piracy/pirateri-
JM%20vejledning.pdf. 
 228.  Id. 
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to determine the guards’ suitability.229 
Similar to the United Kingdom, Norway requires its ship owners to 
conduct a risk assessment of passive and active unarmed measures and 
consult with the ship’s captain before deciding to hire armed guards.230  In 
addition, any ship owner that hires armed security to protect its ships must 
provide certain documentation to the Norwegian Maritime Directorate 
outlining the reasons why more passive defensive measures will not be 
adequate, the suitability and qualifications of the security firm and the 
particular guards to be hired, and the procedures for safely handling and 
storing firearms and ammunition.231  The documentation is designed to 
make companies employ due diligence in selecting a security firm and 
provide the government with some necessary information should it later 
need to investigate any alleged unlawful use of force.232  The government, 
however, specifically states that it is under no duty to conduct a quality 
check on security firms and will only disqualify a security company if it 
has received specific and credible information showing that the firm is 
clearly unsuitable.233 
Finally, Singapore simply refers its ship owners to the non-binding 
guidance contained in the various IMO Circulars, including one that details 
some due diligence in which ship owners should engage before hiring a 
PMSC company.234 
C. Laws and Guidance on the Use of Force 
There is also some concern that private guards may not be aware of or 
be willing to comply with applicable rules regarding the appropriate use of 
force.  As described below, the evidence indicates that some states are 
providing some information about when guards may use deadly force.  On 
the other hand, the comparison of state laws also shows that states are not 
uniform in their guidance and that some guidance is more detailed than 
others.  States seem to be aware that guards may be subject to the laws of 
different jurisdictions depending on where and under what circumstances 
 
 229.  Id.; see also MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, NO. 698, ORDER ON THE USE OF CIVILIAN, ARMED 
GUARDS ON DANISH CARGO SHIPS § 7 (June 27, 2012), available at http://www.dma.dk/SiteCollection 
Documents/Legislation/Orders/2012/BEK-698-27062012-brug%20af%20civile%20bev%C3%A6bnede 
%20vagter%20p%C3%A5%20danske%20lastskibe.pdf (establishing guidelines for approval 
processes). 
 230.  Norway Provisional Guidelines, supra note 212, at 2; Norway Amended Safety Regulations, 
supra note 211, § 20. 
 231.  Norway Amended Safety Regulations, supra note 211, § 20. 
 232.  Norway Provisional Guidelines, supra note 212, at 8–9. 
 233.  Id. at 10. 
 234.  SHIPPING CIRCULAR NO. 15 OF 2012, supra note 215, ¶ 5. 
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they are called upon to defend against a pirate attack, though they seem 
unwilling to opine on the laws of other states and the circumstances under 
which guards may find themselves criminally or civilly liable for using 
force that another state may deem excessive. 
The guidance provided by the United States in this regard is 
illustrative.  It allows ship personnel to use deadly force in self-defense or 
defense of others only when an individual has a “reasonable belief that the 
person or persons to which the deadly force would be directed poses an 
imminent danger of death or great bodily harm.”235  Whether an imminent 
danger exists requires a fact-specific inquiry focusing on whether the 
attacker has the means and opportunity to do an act that may cause great 
bodily injury or death to others.  Means and opportunity to perform a 
deadly act exist when an attacker has, or has apparent access to, a weapon 
that can be used against others and makes a movement that could cause 
another to believe the attacker is threatening great bodily harm—for 
example, pointing a weapon.236  More specifically, the guidance states that 
deadly force may be used when individuals without legal authority fire at, 
attempt to fire at, or attempt an armed boarding of a United States vessel 
carrying embarked individuals.237  The guidance recognizes that the captain 
has command authority over the vessel and that any use of force “is subject 
to the direction of the vessel master.”238  Before employing force, the ship’s 
captain should consider all of the circumstances and resort to deadly force 
only where there is evidence of imminent danger of death or great bodily 
harm.239 
In the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010, the United States has 
also taken what appears to be the unique step among the states in this study 
of immunizing from liability for monetary damages those persons who 
defend a United States vessel against an act of maritime piracy while 
complying with the self-defense rules outlined above.240  At the same time, 
the Act makes clear that the United States can only immunize persons from 
liability under U.S. law—meaning that individuals could still face liability 
 
 235.  PORT SECURITY ADVISORY 3-09, supra note 190, § 3(c). 
 236.  Id. § 2(d). 
 237.  Id. 
 238.  Id. § 3(c). 
 239.  Id. § 3(a). 
 240.  See Pub. L. No. 111-281, 124 Stat. 2905 (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 8107(a) (2012)) (stating that 
immunity shall apply to those who use force in accordance with the standard rules for the use of force in 
self-defense of vessels as prescribed by the Secretary of the Coast Guard).  The prescribed standard 
rules are those outlined in the 2011 Guidance.  See Self-Defense of Vessels of the United States, 76 
Fed. Reg. 39,411 (July 6, 2011). 
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for their conduct in other jurisdictions.241  It nevertheless states, in the text 
of the new Act, that the United States will work through the International 
Maritime Organization to persuade other states to enact limitations on 
liability similar to those established by the provisions of the Act.242 
By its June 2012 Interim Guidance, the United Kingdom also provides 
some direction on what constitutes the appropriate level of force that may 
be used to defend against a pirate attack.  In general, one could characterize 
the country’s approach as a cautious one.  The United Kingdom specifies 
that guards may use force, including lethal force, in self-defense or in 
defense of others as long as the amount of force used “is proportionate and 
reasonable in the circumstances as the defendant genuinely believed them 
to be.”243  A guard need not wait for the aggressor to strike the first blow if 
the person believes that a threat of bodily harm is imminent.244  On the 
other hand, the Guidance explains that security teams should be seeking to 
disrupt any attempted boarding of the vessel “using the minimum force 
necessary.”245  In addition, any escalation in force should be graduated, and 
security personnel should not “needlessly escalate a situation.”246  Indeed, 
the Guidance warns that any measures that show the ability to use force, 
such as making firearms visible or firing warning shots, should be carried 
out “so as not to be taken as acts of aggression.”247  As to using reasonable 
and proportionate force to prevent a crime more generally, the Guidance 
explains that piracy is a crime that can be defended against.248  It also notes, 
though, that the defense is only available to respond to crimes “in 
progress.”249 
Like the United States’ policy, the United Kingdom’s policy 
recognizes the captain’s command authority over the vessel and over any 
decision to use force.250  The Guidance states that the security team has to 
 
 241.   See 46 U.S.C. § 8107(a) (2012) (providing immunity to all ship crewmembers who use force 
in self-defense in U.S. waters). 
 242.  Id. § 8107(b). 
 243.  JUNE 2012 INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 203, §§ 5.4, 5.6.  The June 2012 Interim Guidance 
explains that in England and Wales, “whether a person used reasonable force will be assessed in the 
context of the circumstances as the accused genuinely believed them to be (even if he or she was 
mistaken as to the true circumstances).”  Id. § 8.9 n.12. 
 244.  Id. § 8.12. 
 245.  Id. § 8.3. 
 246.  Id. § 8.5. 
 247.  Id. 
 248.  See id. § 8 (“Defending against pirate attack”). 
 249.  Id. § 8.13 (“If armed guards sighted a pirate skiff (i.e. a skiff obviously equipped to undertake 
acts of piracy), but there was nothing to indicate that the skiff was actively undertaking an act of piracy, 
it would be illegal for armed guards to use force against them.”). 
 250.  Id. § 5.1. 
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advise the captain of any responses available to counter any threat should 
the ship or crew be in danger of an attack.251  Thereafter, the captain “will 
be responsible for determining and exhausting all available options before 
recommending potential armed intervention to overcome a piracy 
threat.”252  At the same time, the Guidance recognizes that there may be 
situations where the crew has “insufficient time” to seek the approval of the 
captain “before a course of action is taken.”253  In such cases, the security 
team must inform the captain about the course of action taken “as soon as 
possible afterwards and explain their reasoning for acting as they did.”254  
In the event of an altercation with pirates, the United Kingdom advises that 
the captain and security team should both make detailed reports of any 
incidents to the relevant international institutions.255 
Unlike the United States, the United Kingdom does not have a law 
specifically immunizing from civil monetary liability those who adhere to 
the legal standards regarding the lawful use of force in self-defense and 
defense of others in responding to pirate attacks.  On the contrary, the 
Guidance explains that although having complied with “rules on the use of 
force may serve to reduce the risk of armed guards acting unlawfully,” 
should criminal charges be brought, “[i]t would be for the enforcement 
agencies and then the court to decide whether the force used in the 
particular case was lawful.”256  Moreover, the government offers no 
guidance on the laws of other countries, except to note that security 
personnel could be liable under laws of other jurisdictions for unlawful use 
of force depending, for example, on where the acts took place.257 
Norway’s guidance on the use of force by armed guards can also be 
described as cautious in approach.  In Norway, the use of force by 
individuals—including private armed security guards—is limited to cases 
“of necessity or self-defence, i.e., cases in which there is no other way out 
and in which the requirements of necessity, reasonableness and 
proportionality are observed in connection with the use of force.”258  But 
the guidance advises that the use of force should be avoided whenever 
possible; should only be employed after other, less radical measures have 
been attempted; and should only be used against a threat that is “direct, 
 
 251.  Id. § 5.4. 
 252.  Id. 
 253.  Id. §5.5. 
 254.  Id. 
 255.  Id. § 9.1. 
 256.  Id. § 8.6. 
 257.  Id. § 8.8. 
 258.  Norway Provisional Guidelines, supra note 212, at 2. 
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immediate, significant and otherwise unavoidable.”259  Further, firing shots 
at a person to render him harmless may only occur after other, gentler 
means have been employed or where no alternative has any chance of 
success.260 
In Norway, the decision of whether to authorize the use of force rests 
with the ship’s captain.261  Any use of firearms must be approved by the 
captain in each individual case and, if circumstances permit, only after 
attackers are warned by means of light and sound signals and warning 
shots.262  While any such use of force must be “proportionate in view of the 
scope of the threat and the conditions otherwise,”263 the guidance notes that 
the captain has significant discretion “when faced with an unclear and 
apparently precarious situation.”264  In fact, even when pirate vessels are 
2,000 meters away, the captain may reasonably conclude that a pirate 
attack is immediate and may require the use of force to repel.265  The 
captain is also charged with the task of having to report to the appropriate 
government entity any use of firearms to repel a pirate attack, including 
that which results in injury or death.266 
Persons employing force will only be immune from criminal 
prosecution under Norwegian law if the use of force is not excessive.267  
Because individuals must in every case independently determine whether 
their use of a firearm is lawful, individuals may be criminally liable for 
excessive use of force even if acting in accordance with the captain’s 
authorization.  Because the ship owner and the captain are responsible for 
establishing conditions under which force may be used, in some cases both 
may also be liable in the event an individual marksman’s use of force is 
excessive.268  On the other hand, if the marksman acts contrary to the 
captain’s instructions, the marksman will likely be the only subject of any 
 
 259.  Norway Provisional Guidelines, supra note 212, at 12; Norway Amended Safety Regulations, 
supra note 211, § 17(2). 
 260.  Norway Provisional Guidelines, supra note 212, at 13; Norway Amended Safety Regulations, 
supra note 211, § 24(4). 
 261.  Norway Amended Safety Regulations, supra note 211, § 17(1). 
 262.  Norway Provisional Guidelines, supra note 212, at 12–13; Norway Amended Safety 
Regulations, supra note 211, §§ 24(1), 24(3).  On the other hand, the ship’s captain need not 
specifically approve each use of firearms and may instead rely on standing orders in some cases, such 
as in the case of a night watch.  Norway Provisional Guidelines, supra note 212, at 12. 
 263.  Norway Provisional Guidelines, supra note 212, at 12; Norway Amended Safety Regulations, 
supra note 211, § 17(2). 
 264.  Norway Provisional Guidelines, supra note 212, at 12. 
 265.  Id. 
 266.  Id. at 13–14. 
 267.  Id. at 5. 
 268.  Id. at 6. 
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criminal prosecution.269  In some special cases, criminal liability may even 
attach to the security firm from which any guard using excessive force was 
hired.270 
Neither Denmark nor Singapore provides any specific guidance on the 
appropriate level of force that guards may use to repel pirate attacks.  
Denmark does refer ship owners to the various IMO Circulars on the use of 
private armed security guards.271  Singapore’s Shipping Circular notes that 
while the crew and any private security personnel may lawfully bear arms, 
“they will still be liable under Singapore’s laws if they use their arms on 
board the ship without lawful excuse, as a person on board is not exempted 
from criminal liability in respect of any offence that he commits on the 
ship.”272  Otherwise, the Circular refers ship owners to the remaining 
guidance contained in the IMO’s Circular, which, it notes, contains advice 
on the command relationship between the captain and any security team, 
the rules regarding the use of force, the management of arms and 
ammunition, and the need for proper recordkeeping.273 
D. Laws and Guidance on Weapons Carriage 
Using private armed guards also poses risks associated with weapons 
carriage and transport.  The need to comply with various state laws can be a 
burden but has also created a situation in which PMSCs are stocking 
floating armories on the high seas—a situation which could create 
significant problems if those arms are not properly safeguarded.274  Again, 
however, the comparison of state laws and guidance shows that states are 
taking different approaches to dealing with the potential issues relating to 
weapons carriage and transport.  Moreover, the comparison suggests that 
states could regulate much more comprehensively than they are: their 
guidance, for example, does not address floating armories or the fact that 
guards can rent any number of automatic weapons in foreign ports. 
In the United States, for instance, ship owners and guards must 
comply with U.S. weapons laws, as well as with any applicable port state 
laws regarding weapons carriage.  Most particularly, they must comply 
with the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which require 
individuals and corporations of the United States to obtain a license in 
 
 269.  Id. at 13. 
 270.  Id. at 6. 
 271.  DANISH STRATEGY, supra note 205, at 27. 
 272.  SHIPPING CIRCULAR NO. 15 OF 2012, supra note 215, ¶ 3. 
 273.  Id. ¶ 2. 
 274.  See discussion supra Part II.B. 
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order to export or import, among other things, firearms and ammunition.275  
The terms “exporting” and “importing” include any manner of “sending or 
taking” the prohibited articles out of the United States.276  Under some 
circumstances, individuals may qualify for an exemption from ITAR’s 
licensing requirement, but in that case they will only be allowed to export 
up to three non-automatic firearms and 1,000 rounds of ammunition.277 
According to a Port Security Advisory issued in 2010, United States 
vessel operators may apply for a temporary export license under ITAR 
should they decide to board firearms.278  Such licenses are valid for up to 
four years and may be used for multiple trips to and from the United 
States.279  To obtain a temporary license, the ship owner must identify the 
precise firearms and ammunition that would be carried on board the vessel 
and must also list the foreign countries for each port of call the ship will 
visit during that time period.280  While the temporary license would allow 
the ship owner to alter the personnel travelling on the vessel, it would not 
allow the firearms to be transferred to any other vessel.281  The Advisory 
explains that to be eligible for a temporary license under ITAR, the arms 
must be for the individual applicant’s exclusive personal use.282  In 
addition, because the exemption only applies to individuals, it cannot be 
used by companies that “desire to hire security teams that will not travel 
with their weapons or where weapons will be transferred from one security 
team or crew member to another.”283  In such circumstances, the vessel 
owner should obtain a temporary license to cover the vessel’s carriage of 
weaponry.284 
The Advisory also notes that United States law places other 
restrictions on the use of firearms, such as registration and transfer 
approval requirements, with which vessel owners and individuals must 
 
 275.  See generally 22 C.F.R. §§ 120–30 (2013); see also 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (listing firearms and 
ammunition as among the articles covered by the ITAR).  The ITAR were issued by the Secretary of 
State pursuant to authority granted by the President pursuant to Executive Order 11958.  Exec. Order 
No. 11,958, 42 Fed. Reg. 4,311 (Jan. 18, 1977).  Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. 
§ 2778 (2012), authorizes the President to control the export and import of defense articles.  PLOCH 
2011, supra note 31, at 38. 
 276.  22 C.F.R. § 120.17(a) (2013). 
 277.  22 C.F.R. § 128.18(c) (2013). 
 278.  U.S. COAST GUARD, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PORT SECURITY ADVISORY (4-09) (REV 4): 
INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS (ITAR) 1 (Sept. 3, 2010). 
 279.  Id. 
 280.  Id. at 1–2. 
 281.  Id. at 2. 
 282.  Id. 
 283.  Id. 
 284.  Id. 
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comply.285  It also emphasizes that vessel owners and operators, as well as 
PMSCs, must comply with any weapons carriage or transport laws of 
foreign states in whose ports they call or through whose waters they 
pass.286  On the other hand, vessel owners and individuals may avoid ITAR 
licensing requirements should they purchase weapons in a foreign country 
and stow them while in a foreign port (assuming doing so does not violate 
the laws of the applicable foreign country).287  Should they seek to bring 
those weapons back into the United States, however, they would have to 
abide by United States weapons importation laws.288 
Like the United States, the United Kingdom also regulates the carriage 
and transport of weapons by armed guards.289  The June 2012 Interim 
Guidance explains that only members of the security team are permitted to 
handle firearms on board UK flagged ships and that no person may possess 
a prohibited firearm without obtaining the proper licenses.290  The 
government and its police will conduct background checks on the PMSC 
and its personnel before granting any license to carry “prohibited firearms” 
on British ships.291  Laws also govern removing firearms or ammunition 
from the country.292  Thus, British companies seeking to provide armed 
guards on ships must now obtain a special export license—called an Open 
General Trade Control License—from the country’s Export Control 
Organisation (ECO).293  The Open General Trade Control License permits 
security firms to deliver or transfer arms and ammunition through foreign 
territories.294  To obtain the license, the PMSC must, among other things, 
submit to the government copies of its rules of engagement and its policies 
 
 285.  Id. at 3. 
 286.  Id. at 4. 
 287.  Id. at 3. 
 288.  Id. 
 289.  It bears noting that England and Wales generally have very strict gun laws and that even the 
police do not carry firearms.  Jon Kelly, Why British Police Don’t Have Guns, BBC News Magazine, 
BBC.COM (2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-19641398.  Individuals may only possess arms 
if they complete and comply with a rigorous licensing process, and possession of a firearm without a 
license is a criminal offense.  Firearms Act, 1968, c. 27, § 5, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ 
ukpga/1968/27; Firearms Licensing: Frequently Asked Questions, METROPOLITAN POLICE, http://www 
.met.police.uk/firearms_licensing/faqs.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2013). 
 290.  JUNE 2012 INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 203, § 6.5. 
 291.  THORP, supra note 121, at 11. 
 292.  JUNE 2012 INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 203, § 6.15. 
 293.  Id. § 6.16.  For details about the Open General Trade Control License, see Open General 
Trade Control Licences, Department for Business Innovation & Skills, GOV.UK (Dec. 12, 2012), https:// 
www.gov.uk/open-general-trade-control-licences. 
 294.  Trade Licence: Open General Trade Control Licence (Maritime Anti-Piracy), Department for 
Business, Innovation & Skills, GOV.UK (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/eco/ogels-
current/12-628-ogtcl-maritime-anti-piracy.pdf. 
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on safely storing firearms.295  It must also maintain records showing proper 
usage of the license.296  Failure to comply with licensing requirements can 
result in withdrawal of the license or possibly even prosecution.297 
The Guidance anticipates that British ship owners and operators will 
not ordinarily need to export any firearms or ammunition from the United 
Kingdom.298  Rather, since ship owners may only employ armed security 
personnel in high risk areas, the expectation is that the security team and 
their arms and ammunition will likely embark and disembark outside the 
territory.299  Nevertheless, British ship owners still need to comply with the 
weapons carriage and usage laws of the coastal states through which they 
travel or be subject to liability for failing to do so in those foreign 
jurisdictions.300 
Norway also regulates the use of weapons, including by private 
security personnel.  Individuals must obtain a permit from the chief of 
police in order to own or hold firearms on Norwegian soil, including on its 
flagged ships.301  Norwegian flagged ship owners wanting to bring armed 
guards on board their ships are also required to obtain a general firearms 
permit allowing them to hold prohibited weapons on board.302  Such 
permits are valid for up to six months and are not linked to individual 
firearms or a specific assignment or security firm.303  Instead, the licenses 
will more generally allow the ship owner to hold otherwise prohibited 
weapons, including fully automatic guns or single-shot repeating 
weapons.304  To comply with the license, the ship owner must submit to the 
government—and follow—a plan to safely store and transport firearms and 
ammunition in a manner that will keep unauthorized persons from gaining 
access to them.305  Norway’s Provisional Guidelines further caution the 
ship owner to ensure that it can comply with any relevant port laws where 
its guards will embark or disembark.306 
Lastly, Denmark provides little express guidance on arms carriage 
other than in its requirements for the arms certificate for which ship owners 
 
 295.  Id. 
 296.  Id. 
 297.  Id. 
 298.  JUNE 2012 INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 203, § 6.12. 
 299.  Id. 
 300.  Id. §§ 6.8–6.11. 
 301.  Norway Provisional Guidelines, supra note 212, at 3. 
 302.  Id. at 6. 
 303.  Id. 
 304.  Id. at 7. 
 305.  Id. at 11. 
 306.  Id. at 9. 
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must apply in order to employ armed guards.  In that regard, Denmark 
makes ship owners identify the specific weapons the ship seeks to bring on 
board, the methods for storing those weapons, and whether the arms will be 
carried out of or into Denmark.307  Likewise, Singapore has not issued 
specific guidance on arms carriage except to refer ship owners to the 
various IMO Circulars on the use of private armed security guards.308 
V. A CALL FOR MORE COORDINATED REGULATION 
As the comparison of state laws and guidance shows, states have taken 
various approaches towards regulating the use of private armed guards in 
the fight against maritime piracy.  Still, even more needs to be done.  States 
that have not issued any precise guidance regulating the selection of armed 
guards or advising them on the lawful use and transport of weapons should 
do so.  States that have issued guidance in these respects should be more 
precise.  More importantly, this Article urges states to work together and 
arrive at one set of clear regulations to govern the use and conduct of 
private armed guards in the maritime piracy context.  Maritime piracy is an 
international crime, and the fight against it occurs on international waters.  
Moreover, states are responsible for the fight against piracy.  Thus, all 
states should ensure that the private contractors that they allow to use guns 
to protect ships against piracy act lawfully and properly when doing so. 
The best way to establish one clear set of regulations governing the 
use and conduct of armed guards is through an international convention.  
By that convention, states could agree on the necessary qualifications for 
any maritime security personnel.  They could also agree on the types of 
weapons that guards may use, the circumstances under which they may use 
them, and the methods by which they may store and transport them. 
Even without an international convention, states could do a better job 
of mitigating the risks associated with using private armed guards.  To that 
end, the sections that follow suggest some standards or practices that all 
states should adopt or on which they should agree to help minimize the 
risks and practical difficulties associated with employing these private 
actors.  Deterrence of pirate attacks by armed guards benefits the world 
community.  That benefit may be outweighed, however, unless states work 
together to ensure that the use of armed guards does not unnecessarily 
escalate violence, involve the unlawful use of force, endanger innocent 
 
 307.  INFORMATION THAT SHOULD ACCOMPANY A SHIPPING COMPANY’S APPLICATION FOR USING 
ARMED CIVILIAN GUARDS ON BOARD DANISH SHIPS, supra note 227.. 
 308.  See SHIPPING CIRCULAR NO. 15 OF 2012, supra note 215 (“This circular serves to inform on 
the revised interim guidance being promulgated by IMO in the document MSC.1/Circ. 
1405/Rev.2 . . . .”). 
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seafarers, or cause international incidents. 
A. The Regulation and Monitoring of the PMSC Industry Generally 
As an initial matter, states should work together to make certain that 
the PMSC industry is regulated and monitored so that only properly vetted 
personnel can protect commercial vessels travelling through pirate-infested 
waters.  Allowing private armed guards to supplement the work of United 
Nations-sanctioned naval patrols carries the risks that private guards may 
be woefully undertrained as compared to their government military 
counterparts and also that they may not be subject to the same monitoring 
mechanisms.  If states are not actually regulating and monitoring PMSC 
conduct, the risk that untrained “cowboy” guards will be patrolling the seas 
is a real one. 
The comparison of state laws, however, suggests that for the most 
part, states do not want to play a role in regulating the PMSC industry or 
vetting guards.  This is not to suggest that states have not made a helpful 
contribution by issuing some guidelines that ship owners should follow 
when conducting due diligence of the various PMSCs they might seek to 
hire.  Providing non-binding guidance, however, is not the same as 
subjecting PMSCs to some form of regulation that includes accreditation 
standards and monitoring to ensure that those standards are followed.  
Giving ship owners a list of items to address when conducting due 
diligence does not necessarily ensure that the ship owner will ferret out a 
PMSC that is disreputable or whose guards are not properly trained.  Ship 
owners are not necessarily experts in the maritime security industry and 
will likely rely on the PMSCs’ own marketing materials and statements 
when choosing a firm.  Further, ship owners face the competing incentive 
of wanting to employ a less costly PMSC, even if it means that the guards 
they hire do not have the highest level of qualifications.  The fact that some 
states also require ship owners to provide the state with information about 
the PMSC and its guards is an exercise that should help impress upon ship 
owners the need to hire a reputable firm.  That advance information about 
the PMSCs may also be helpful should the state, or others, need to 
investigate any later claim that a guard used unlawful force.  Unless 
PMSCs are more meaningfully vetted by some entity with appropriate 
expertise, ship owners may still wittingly, or unwittingly, hire armed 
guards who are not well trained or not prepared to abide by all applicable 
laws governing the carriage and use of weapons. 
Rather than passing the buck to ship owners, states need to accept 
responsibility for ensuring that only qualified, trained, and responsible 
security personnel play a role in the fight against maritime piracy.  Indeed, 
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states bear the overall responsibility to undertake that fight.309  State 
regulation of PMSC licensing or accreditation standards and monitoring 
mechanisms to ensure compliance would provide a needed level of 
protection against the possibility of untrained guards operating on the high 
seas.310  Nevertheless, for any such PMSC regulatory scheme to be optimal, 
states cannot operate in isolation.  All states should agree on a set of 
standards; otherwise, substandard PMSCs will find states with looser 
standards on whose ships their guards can operate.  Absent an agreed-upon 
international standard, PMSCs will be able to register themselves in a 
different jurisdiction so as to take advantage of lax laws.  These very issues 
have been raised in the more general context of private military security 
services.  In that context, commentators have noted that unless all states 
agree on a regulatory system, firms will simply move their operations to a 
“more hospitable” country where laws will allow them to operate with little 
or no oversight.311 
Although getting all states to agree on a regulatory scheme for PMSCs 
may require some effort, the payoff is safer seas for all who travel through 
them—a payoff that all states should want to realize.  Nor would states 
need to start with a blank slate in creating such a regulatory scheme.  
Indeed, the maritime industry is undertaking various steps to encourage 
PMSCs to engage in self-regulation.  In late 2012, the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) issued guidelines setting out some 
best practices that PMSCs should adopt to ensure their companies and 
personnel offer quality, professional services to ship owners seeking anti-
piracy protection.312  In addition, one non-governmental organization, the 
Security Association for the Maritime Industry (SAMI), has begun work on 
 
 309.  Most states, in fact, are parties to UNCLOS and have pledged to “cooperate to the fullest 
extent possible in the repression of piracy.”  UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 100.  For a list of state 
ratifications, see Div. for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, Chronological 
Lists of Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to the Convention and the Related Agreements as 
at 29 October 2013, UNITED NATIONS (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/ 
chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm. 
 310.  States like the Netherlands could continue to allow their ship owners to only hire VPDs.  
VPDs are comprised of government military personnel who presumably would meet any training 
standards agreed upon for PMSCs.  See discussion supra Part II.A.  Indeed, one reason ship owners 
have urged states to provide them with military armed guards is because of the presumption that on the 
whole most military personnel are properly trained and prepared to abide by applicable laws.  Id. 
 311.  Deven R. Desai, Have Your Cake and Eat It Too: A Proposal For a Layered Approach to 
Regulating Private Military Companies, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 825, 851 (2005). 
 312.  International Organization for Standardization [ISO], Ships and Marine Technology — 
Guidelines for Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSC) Providing Privately Contracted Armed 
Security Personnel (PCASP) on board Ships (and Pro Forma Contract), ISO/PAS 28007:2012 (2012) 
[hereinafter ISO Guidelines] (on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law). 
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an accreditation system for PMSCs.313  Headquartered in the United 
Kingdom, SAMI’s stated aim is to “facilitate clear dialogue and a common 
standards framework in the delivery of maritime security products to the 
shipping community.”314  PMSCs that join SAMI for a fee may also choose 
to participate in its recently-introduced Certification Program.  Participants 
in that program submit to an independent auditing process so as to be 
recognized as an accredited and reputable security provider.315  That 
auditing process involves a review of company documentation and an on-
site visit whereby SAMI experts examine management and operational 
logistics, including the management of personnel.316  As of early January 
2013, approximately 30 PMSCs had successfully passed the documentation 
phase of SAMI’s certification process.317  Recent reports, in fact, indicate 
that SAMI will be overseeing a similar certification process for PMSCs that 
want to demonstrate compliance with the new ISO Guidelines.318 
The ISO Guidelines and the SAMI and ISO certification processes are 
certainly a welcome step in regulating the PMSC industry.  But these 
standards and processes are voluntary: the professional PMSCs will likely 
embrace them to demonstrate their quality and capabilities.  Without a 
state-required, mandatory system with oversight and penalties for 
noncompliance, what assurances are there that all PMSCs operating on the 
high seas will conduct themselves according to these high standards?  Self-
regulation is no substitute for uniform and coordinated state regulation. 
Nevertheless, states could build on these self-regulation efforts and 
establish a similar certification process for PMSCs.  If states investigated 
the current certification processes and concluded that they were sufficiently 
rigorous, they might be able to agree on a regulatory scheme that allows 
ship owners to only hire, for example, SAMI-certified PMSCs.  Initial 
certification should not constitute the end of the process, however.  To 
make certain that PMSCs continue to deliver quality, reputable services, 
they would need to be monitored by way of a public reporting mechanism 
 
 313.  Id. 
 314.  SEC. ASS’N FOR THE MAR. INDUS., GUIDELINES ON JOINING THE SECURITY ASSOCIATION FOR 
THE MARITIME INDUSTRY (2012), available at http://www.seasecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/SAMI-
Joining-Guide-Dec-2012.pdf. 
 315.  SAMI Certification for PMSCs, SECURITY ASS’N FOR MAR. INDUSTRY, http://www. 
seasecurity.org/sami-certification-for-pmscs/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2013). 
 316.  Id. 
 317.  Certified Members, SECURITY ASS’N FOR MAR. INDUSTRY, http://www.seasecurity.org/ 
certified-members/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2013). 
 318.  Gavin van Marle, New Anti-Piracy Standards Will Boost Confidence in Private Guards, 
LOADSTAR (June 19, 2013), http://theloadstar.co.uk/new-anti-piracy-standards-will-boost-confidence-
in-private-guards/. 
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or some external audit procedures.  Here again, states could place such a 
monitoring function in the hands of an institution like SAMI.319  To defer 
the costs of certification and monitoring, states could implement a fee-
based system, much like that used by SAMI for its members.320  In any 
event, states are already spending billions on the navies that patrol on anti-
piracy missions.321  If they have to contribute additional sums to ensure that 
the supplemental private forces they permit ship owners to hire are 
qualified and trained to properly and lawfully use and transport weapons, 
that money will be well spent. 
B. Use of Force 
Coordinated regulation and monitoring of the PMSC industry should 
help to ensure that guards are properly trained on the lawful use of force.  
States, however, should work together on coordinated guidance specifically 
addressing when guards may properly use lethal force.  If states do not 
articulate clear rules on the use of force, or even if those rules differ among 
states, guards may have difficulty knowing what is expected of them.  In 
this international context, guards may be employed by a PMSC that 
operates in one state, they may be hired by a shipping company flagged in a 
different state, and they may find themselves repelling an attack against 
still another state’s nationals or in another state’s territory.  The analysis of 
state laws above demonstrates the need for all states to provide clear and 
concrete guidance on the use of force and to increase the level of 
uniformity in that guidance where possible.  Recall that Denmark and 
 
 319.  For a detailed discussion of how one might structure an international framework to regulate 
the private military security companies that contract with governments to supplement and help support 
armed forces participating in various armed conflicts and in post-conflict peacekeeping operations, see 
Peter W. Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and International 
Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 521, 544–46 (2004). 
 320.  Some evidence indicates that the United Kingdom is working with a trade industry partner, 
the Security in Complex Environments Group (SCEG), to establish a regulatory framework to govern 
its PMSCs.  According to the SCEG website, the approach currently under consideration would involve 
a mixture of self-regulation and external audit.  See About the SCEG, SECURITY IN COMPLEX ENV’TS 
GROUP (June 12, 2013), http://www.adsgroup.org.uk/pages/19813174.asp.  Germany also seems to be in 
the process of amending its laws to require PMSCs to meet certain licensing requirements before they 
can be hired to work on German flagged ships.  Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung: Entwurf eines 
Gesetzes zur Einführung eines Zulassungsverfahrens für Bewachungsunternehmen auf Seeschiffen 
[Draft Law to Establish a Procedure for Security Companies on Seagoing Vessels], Oct. 10, 2012, at 17, 
10960, amending HANDELSGESETZBUCH [HGB] [Commercial Code], Feb. 22, 1999, [BGBL. I] 202, as 
amended.  According to the proposed laws, a federal agency will be tasked with administering the 
licensing process, determining whether requirements for licensing are made, id. at 7–10, and for 
publishing a list of approved companies, id. at 14.  Both the United Kingdom and German frameworks 
could also serve as guides for a framework to be adopted by all states to regulate PMSCs. 
 321.  See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
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Singapore authorize the use of armed guards but that they do not provide 
any details on when guards may use lethal force to repel a pirate attack.322  
Both countries presumably have general self-defense laws that PMSCs 
could independently research.  This approach, though, leaves significant 
room for error.  States are responsible for the fight against piracy, and they 
are also in the best position to articulate the precise contours of their laws.  
Leaving it to PMSCs to decipher state laws on the use of force may save 
the state some time at the outset, but it will not guarantee that state laws are 
followed or that international incidents are avoided. 
Lack of uniformity among state laws on the use of force may also 
cause confusion since guards may be required to interpret and comply with 
different sets of laws and guidance.  The United States and the United 
Kingdom authorize deadly force where guards possess a reasonable belief 
that lives are in imminent danger.323  Norway’s laws seem similar in 
permitting deadly force in response to a threat that is “direct, immediate, 
significant and otherwise unavoidable.”324  Nevertheless, there are reasons 
to suspect these states may not necessarily reach the same conclusion about 
whether the use of force in any given instance was lawful.  For example, 
Norway only allows firing shots to render a person harmless after 
employing more gentle means or where no alternative has any chance of 
success.325  At the same time, its guidance provides that a pirate attack may 
be immediate and that force may be used to repel an attack even if pirate 
vessels are 2,000 meters away.326  The guidance issued by the United 
Kingdom states that guards must “use the minimum force necessary” to 
disrupt any attempted boarding of the vessel and that as long as there is 
nothing to indicate a pirate skiff is actively undertaking an act of piracy, 
guards would be wrong to use force against them.327  Can the guidance of 
both states be reconciled?  Would the actions of the guards on the Avocet 
be legal under either set of guidelines?  Under Norway’s or the United 
Kingdom’s guidance, do the guards need to see the alleged pirates aiming 
weapons before they are permitted to use lethal force in self-defense? 
States need to clarify not only what level of force may be used under 
 
 322.  See supra notes 271–73 and accompanying text. 
 323.  See JUNE 2012 INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 203, ¶¶ 8.9, 8.10, 8.12 (stating that the United 
Kingdom allows deadly force to defend against imminent danger to lives as long as the force is 
“proportionate and reasonable in the circumstances as the defendant genuinely believed them to be.”); 
PORT SECURITY ADVISORY 3-09, supra note 190, § 4(d) (stating that the United States permits deadly 
force when an individual has a “reasonable belief” of imminent danger to lives). 
 324.  See supra note 259 and accompanying text. 
 325.  See supra note 260 and accompanying text. 
 326.  See supra note 265 and accompanying text. 
 327.  See supra notes 245, 249 and accompanying text. 
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certain circumstances but also other matters relating to the use of force: 
who may authorize the use of force, whether and to whom notice should be 
given if force is used, and whether and to whom liability might attach if 
excessive force is used.  State guidance must also be sufficiently detailed so 
that guards actually know what is expected of them.  To simply indicate 
that the captain is in control of the vessel and must authorize any use of 
force can leave room for interpretation—and for errors.  Yet, this is 
essentially the guidance provided by the United States.328  By contrast, the 
more specific guidance of the United Kingdom indicates that the security 
team must advise the captain of available responses to counter any threat 
and that the security team may only take action after obtaining the captain’s 
approval—or, if exigent circumstances did not permit an advance 
discussion, must discuss any use of force with the captain afterwards.329 
Here, again, the maritime industry has made some efforts at self-
regulation.  Attached to the new ISO Guidelines is a recommended 
standard contract to be used by ship owners when employing armed 
guards.330  The contract, developed by the shipping industry organization 
BIMCO in 2012, addresses the need for private guards to abide by laws 
regulating the use of force.331  These are admirable efforts, and some ship 
owners likely do require their guards to sign such a contract and also 
caution the guards to only use lawful force.  As with vetting and 
accreditation, however, unless states agree on some rules of force and make 
those clear to guards, there are no assurances that guards can, or will be 
able to, abide by them.  By failing to provide guards with detailed 
guidance, and by not coordinating that guidance, states are running the risk 
that guards do not know what is expected of them or that another state 
disagrees with a guard’s use of force. 
Further, the notice provisions of the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Norway are different.  Norway requires notice to its 
government when force is used to repel an attack.332  The United Kingdom 
advises that the captain and security team should make detailed reports of 
any incidents to certain relevant international institutions.333  This seems an 
 
 328.  See supra note 238 and accompanying text. 
 329.  See supra notes 251–54 and accompanying text. 
 330.  ISO Guidelines, supra note 312. 
 331.  Id.; see also THE BALTIC AND INT’L MAR. COUNCIL, GUARDCON—CONTRACT FOR THE 
EMPLOYMENT OF SECURITY GUARDS ON VESSELS, Annex D, ¶¶ 2, 7 (2013), available at https://www. 
bimco.org/Chartering/Documents/Security/~/media/Chartering/Document_Samples/Sundry_Other_For
ms/Sample_Copy_GUARDCON__04_01_2013.ashx. 
 332.  See supra note 266 and accompanying text. 
 333.  See supra note 255 and accompanying text. 
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area where states should agree that broad notice is required following an 
incident since the fight against maritime piracy occurs in the international 
arena and the international community has an interest in ensuring that any 
use of force was appropriate. 
Finally, the issue of liability is not only one on which states should 
provide information to their constituencies but is also one on which they 
should cooperate to reach some agreements about jurisdictional priorities in 
case questions arise about whether any guards used excessive force.  It is 
well settled that private citizens must comply with the laws of any state in 
whose territory they appear or risk civil or criminal liability in that foreign 
jurisdiction.334  Thus, as the United Kingdom has warned, PMSC personnel 
may find that, in addition to the United Kingdom, “other countries may 
also have a right to assert jurisdiction over a case and apply their own 
nationals laws governing the use of force”—depending, for example, on 
where the offense occurred or the nationality of the victims or 
perpetrators.335  What, though, are the rules for state military personnel who 
have been hired out by the state as part of a VPD?  As the Enrica Lexie 
incident demonstrates, not all states will necessarily agree that military 
personnel hired to work in a private capacity are entitled to any of the same 
immunities that might be granted to military personnel working on state 
military missions.336  The only way to avoid additional, similar diplomatic 
disagreements about whether immunity applies is for states to agree on 
clear rules in advance.  States have negotiated Status of Forces Agreements 
for their military personnel.337  They can take the same or similar 
precautions if they want to use and obtain immunity for their VPD military 
personnel. 
Even if states do not reach any such agreements, they should still seek 
to agree on a process for determining which state will be able to exercise 
jurisdiction if the use of force results in injury or death.  This may not be 
easy to accomplish since states will have to agree to surrender jurisdiction 
even before they know the precise factual circumstances of an event.  But 
why could they not agree to allow the flag state to exercise primary 
jurisdiction over offenses committed by private guards acting on anti-
piracy missions as long as the flag state had procedures for vetting guards 
and laws to punish for excessive force?  With these provisos, the foreign 
jurisdiction should have some assurances that the guards were not 
 
 334.  See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 335.  JUNE 2012 INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 203, § 8.8. 
 336.  See supra notes 146–50 and accompanying text. 
 337.  See supra notes 143–45 and accompanying text. 
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untrained “cowboy” guards.  The requirement that the flag state have laws 
to punish excessive force should provide some assurances that justice will 
be done—though it will not eliminate the risk that the flag state fact finder 
may reach a different conclusion as to whether force was excessive under 
the circumstances.  Indeed, such a regime would not be unlike that which 
states negotiate when they enter into SOFAs. 
It may not be realistic to expect that states will amend their criminal 
codes so that they all have identical rules on when civilians may use force 
in self-defense or defense of others.  This does not mean that states 
permitting private armed guards on their ships cannot provide clear and 
detailed guidance on what is expected of those guards.  It also does not 
mean that states cannot agree on uniform rules that govern aspects of the 
use of force that are unique to the maritime piracy context, such as 
command authority and notice provisions.  States can also minimize the 
potential for diplomatic tensions if they agree in advance on how they will 
resolve jurisdictional disputes should guards use force in a situation where 
laws in addition to those of the flag state could apply.  The need to avoid 
chaos on the high seas is good reason for states to provide clear, detailed, 
and uniform guidance. 
C. Weapons Carriage 
Lastly, it is imperative that states work together to develop clear and 
concrete rules regarding weapons carriage.  Flag states can take the lead by 
strictly regulating weapons carriage, including the types of weapons guards 
can use and how they can obtain them.  Yet, as the comparison of state 
laws and guidance shows, not all states specifically regulate weapons 
carriage and some regulations have significant and important gaps in their 
coverage.  Both the United States and the United Kingdom require special 
licenses for the export of firearms.338  But the U.S. guidance also explains 
that U.S. export laws may not apply when private guards obtain weapons in 
foreign ports and do not bring them back to the flag state.339  Thus, even the 
United States’ regulatory scheme seemingly permits guards to buy or lease 
firearms, including automatic weapons, while in some foreign port states.  
The United States’ laws and those of other states also do not seem to 
specifically prohibit guards from obtaining weapons from the many 
floating armories operating on the high seas.340  Yet, without such a 
 
 338.  See supra notes 275–300 and accompanying text. 
 339.  See supra notes 287–88 and accompanying text. 
 340.  For a discussion of the practice of using floating armories, see supra notes 97–98, 125–35 and 
accompanying text. 
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specific prohibition, states have lost an opportunity to monitor weapons 
access, thus potentially putting innocent lives at risk.  Additionally, if 
floating armories are not well guarded, they could be accessed for criminal 
purposes.  At present, however, no national or international regulations 
govern the use of floating armories.341 
Fully regulating weapons carriage will require flag states to decide 
whether the guards that their ship owners hire should be allowed access to 
particular types of weapons, such as fully automatic firearms.  If the state 
concludes that access to such weapons unnecessarily increases the 
possibility that guards will violate laws on the use of force, then the state 
should ensure that its regulations permit it to exercise some oversight.  In 
this regard, Denmark appears to have a helpful model on which states 
might build since it requires its ship owners to identify the specific 
weapons that will be brought on board before the ship owner may obtain a 
firearms certificate.342  Even Denmark’s regulations, however, could be 
more specific by providing that the ship owners and guards are prohibited 
from obtaining those weapons from a floating armory. 
The existence of the new and unregulated floating armories raises an 
additional issue: different port states have different laws regulating the 
carriage and transport of weapons.  After all, PMSCs apparently developed 
the practice of using floating armories to avoid navigating what some have 
suggested is a complicated legal minefield.343  An agreement among all 
port states to permit armed security personnel to carry certain weapons in 
their territory for the limited purpose of participating in a sanctioned anti-
piracy mission would help to eliminate the difficulties of following 
different port state laws.  Some evidence already indicates that port states 
are willing to cooperate in this regard.  Even though Singapore has strict 
weapons laws, the Netherlands has apparently reached an agreement with it 
to allow the storage of weapons and ammunition in Singapore’s port for 
use by its VPDs.344  As of late 2011, Egypt had banned commercial ships 
from carrying any weapons in its ports, but by early 2012, it had changed 
its laws to allow foreign weapons in its territory as long as the weapons 
were kept in a sealed container and delivered to Egyptian authorities while 
the ship was in port or travelling through the Suez Canal.345  Other port 
 
 341.  See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 342.  See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
 343.  See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 344.  See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 345.  In late 2011, Egypt decreed that commercial ships travelling through its waters were 
prohibited from carrying weapons on board; violations would be punished by arrest of the ship, the 
captain, and any armed personnel.  Egypt Bans Weapons on Ships Transiting Its Waters, BANGKOK 
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states may also be persuaded to change their laws to allow for weapons 
carriage—particularly if the international community actually agrees to 
regulate and vet PMSCs so that only trained and reputable guards would be 
participating in the fight against piracy. 
Alternatively, if port states cannot be persuaded to allow security 
personnel to carry certain weapons in their territories under certain 
circumstances, states need to ensure that ship owners and PMSCs fully 
understand and comply with the various port state laws regarding weapons 
carriage.  States should not be able to simply issue general warnings on the 
need to comply with laws of foreign states through which the vessel 
passes.346  It may be difficult for states to obtain information about different 
state laws, especially if those laws are sometimes in flux, as they may be 
given that the use of armed guards conducting anti-piracy missions is a 
relatively new phenomenon.347  On the other hand, the IMO has identified 
areas that pose the greatest risk of pirate attacks,348 and some states, like the 
United Kingdom, will only permit armed guards to operate on their flagged 
ships in those identified high risk areas.349  States authorizing the use of 
armed guards could at least take the initiative to provide their 
constituencies with information about the weapons carriage laws of the 
limited number of states bordering the areas posing the highest threat of 
pirate attacks.350  Again, states are charged with fighting maritime piracy, 
and they should take the lead in ensuring that the fight is carried out safely 
and in compliance with all relevant laws, rather than in a way that might 
encourage guards to rely on floating armories on the high seas. 
 
SHIPOWNERS AND AGENTS ASS’N (Sept. 16, 2011, 12:24), http://www.thaibsaa.com/news/world-
shipping-news/362-egypt-bans-weapons-on-ships-transiting-its-waters.html.  In early 2012, Egypt 
changed its laws to require vessels to file a declaration 48 hours before arriving at an Egyptian port or 
transiting through the Suez Canal with details regarding any weapons, ammunition, and guards on 
board, as well as confirmation that weapons and ammunition will be in a sealed box for delivery to 
Egyptian authorities until the ship leaves port or exits the Suez Canal.  Egypt – Carriage of Weapons, 
Ammunition, and Armed Guards – Further Update, WEST OF ENG. (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www. 
westpandi.com/Publications/News/Archive/Egypt—-Carriage-of-Weapons-Ammunition-and-Armed-
Guards—-Update/. 
 346.  See, e.g., supra note 300 and accompanying text (discussing the United Kingdom guidance 
warning states of the need to comply with port and coastal state laws governing weapons carriage). 
 347.  See Houreld, supra note 14 (stating that in early 2012, Egypt, Oman, and Kenya all changed 
their rules regarding weapons carriage). 
 348.  BMP4, supra note 166, ¶ 2.4 (defining the “High Risk Area” as “an area bounded by Suez 
and the Strait of Hormuz to the North, 10S and 78E”). 
 349.  JUNE 2012 INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 203, § 1.6. 
 350.  Maps of the “High Risk Area” suggest the following coastal states: India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, 
Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Yemen, Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, 
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at 86–87. 
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CONCLUSION 
The fight against maritime piracy is a worthy one.  Yet, the 
international community suffers if states permit private armed guards to 
participate in that fight without also taking steps to guarantee that those 
private actors will act lawfully and properly.  While the military personnel 
participating in the anti-piracy patrols are not perfect, they are generally 
trained, under an officer’s command, and subject to disciplinary 
proceedings or other potential actions should they fail to act lawfully and 
properly.  Currently, however, there are no assurances that the private 
armed guards that ship owners hire are well trained or prepared to follow 
orders and abide by applicable laws.  Moreover, there is no guarantee that 
private armed guards will be punished should they fail to act lawfully. 
Fighting the international crime of maritime piracy requires 
international coordination and transparency regarding the rules that will 
govern the use of private armed guards.  To continue with a system 
whereby each state creates its own rules, or no rules at all, creates the risk 
of “Blackwater moments.”351  All civilized states should view such a risk as 
unacceptable and therefore take responsibility for regulating and 
monitoring the private actors that they are authorizing ship owners to hire 
for protection against pirate attacks. 
 
 351.  See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
